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THE SURGE OF SOUVERAINISM IN RADICAL RIGHT
POPULISM. 
THE ITALIAN CASE OF THE LEAGUE.
Introduction
At present, Europe has rediscovered the attraction to radicalism and in
particular, the parties and movements, which benefit more, have been
the far-right parties. Several nations among the European Union have
found  new  force  in  a  defensive  and  conservative  behavior  towards
European institutions and neighboring borders. In direct opposition to
the priorities indicated by the European Commission (Bassot and Hiller
2016), as instance in terms of migration and asylum policies, the right-
wing  movements  have  spread  their  influence  across  the  continent,
gathering support and visibility over all the social classes, even from the
strongholds of the Left, as public employees and senior management.
The  radical  right  movements  are  proposing  their  elements  of
discrimination, nationalism and conservatism, and in doing so, they are
based on a  behavior  of  “resistance  to  change and the  acceptance  of
inequalities”, mostly as a result of the modernity drama (Aspelund at al
2013). It is important to specify that within the family of the far-right
Parties, there are several and very distinguished subclasses of parties.
Among  them,  it  will  be  taken  into  consideration  only  the  populist
radical right (PRR) (Ignazi 2003).
The aim of this thesis is to analyze through a critical discourse analysis
the  changing  processes  within  the  most  popular  Italian  PRR,  the
League, in order to understand the effects of new leader Matteo Salvini
in the surge of the phenomenon in Italy. Along with it, the relevance of
the Salvini effect is unquestioned in the Italian panorama, and the quiet
unique  transformation,  that  occured  with  the  Northern  League  once
Salvini reached the leadership, put this phenomenon under spotlight and
demand analysis.
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In the beginning, the Northern League was born as an anti-fascist, pro-
North, Federalist Party in order to pursue the instances of the northerner
population, and it remained particularly bounded to this legacy until the
rise to the secretariat of Matteo Salvini in 2013. Under his leadership,
the League has  seen a drastic  shift  towards new political  issues and
social matters. Once removed Northern from the name, the League has
transformed  itself  into  an  anti-establishment,  populist  radical,  anti-
globalization, and nationwide party, introducing in the political frame
the  concept  and  the  doctrine  of  souverainism  and  some  populism
patterns  (Albertazzi  et  al  2018).  The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to
answer the following question:  how does Salvini’s rhetoric cope with
the  Italian  electorate  incrementing  demand  on  souverainism  in  his
public speeches? 
Despite  the  main  features  of  the League has  been maintained,  some
others, as populist souverainism must be studied. A single-N descriptive
study will be developed in this thesis in order to motivate and evaluate
the astonishing growth that occurred between 2017 and 2019, including
a mention of the European Parliament elections, when the party reached
its apex.
Therefore, since “few theoretical frameworks include internal supply-
side factors” (Mudde 2007, pp.276) exists, it is the aim of this thesis to
explain the effects of what can be called “Salvinism” in the surge of the
PRR in Italy.  To detect  the term “Salvinism”,  firstly I  will  seek the
bravura of the League’s leader in riding the wave of people’s fright in
order to establish or increase the xenophobic sense of threat across the
Italian social classes. And secondly, the recall to sovereignist doctrine
that has created a perfect field for the growth of dissatisfaction and the
rise of the PRR party.  To do so,  in the analyses a  critical  discourse
analysis will be applied to the Salvini’s public speeches at the Federal
Congress of the League in 2017 and 2019, and Salvini’s speeches taken
in Pontida during the annual conference in 2017, 2018 and 2019. 
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It  is  expected  that  Salvini’s  speeches  do  affect  the  results  of  the
outcome of the election in a positive way for two reasons: the first one
is that the Italian electorate respects the characteristics for the success of
PRR in terms of Mudde’s micro-level  (2007),  the second is  that  the
sovereignist positions are perceived as a new issue to be addressed in
the national political framework, so for this reason, the League could
take  advantages  of  a  political  breakthrough,  and  in  the  meantime
maintain a solid vote-basement in its strongholds.




3. analysis and conclusion section.
In the first section, it would be a discussion about the theories regarding
far-right movements and parties in Western Europe. Then some room
would be given to the history of the League and the reasons that brought
to such a growth of the party, it follows a subchapter about the far-right
rhetoric  and the  politics  of  fear  used  by the  League’s  leadership.  A
section would discuss about the outlooks of Italian electorate demand
and the supply furnished by the party. Thus, and finally, some space
would be reserved for the theories regarding populist radical right and
souverainism. Indeed, the innovation of the League comes with the fact
that its establishment implemented the populist rhetoric with the claims
on  sovereignty.  Along  with  it,  on  one  hand,  the  Italian  political
environment  showed that  it  is  possible  to consider  souverainism and
populism  as  two  faces  of  the  same  coin.  On  the  other  hand,  the
electorate  behavior  displayed  a  positive  inclination  to  the  charm  of
rhetoric and narrative.
Following  this  theoretical  section,  the  thesis  will  present  the
methodological  chapter  with  the  analysis  of  the  critical  discourse
analysis (CDA) as the main tool used in this disseration and how it will
be applied to the public and official discourses of Matteo Salvini.
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Finally, there will be the core chapter of the analysis. In that chapter,
thanks  to  the  methods  of  CDA,  the  speeches  of  Salvini  will  be
translated and discussed in detail  according to polarization,  syntaxes,
identification, vocabulary, activities and shared knowledge. Moreover,
this last section will conclude the thesis by reporting the results of the
analysis and confirming or denying the expectations mentioned in the
theoretical chapter.
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The implementation of the souverainism in the Italian political frame
The aim of  this  chapter  is  to  unfold the  most  recent  and applicable
theories  regarding three  main  topics  and then to show how they are
related to each other. The first one is the far-right parties, which have
recently  seen  a  significant  growth  in  numbers  of  adepts  and
sympathizers.  The second, the use of fear in rhetoric and discourses,
and how they are  used  by the  parties’  leadership  to  shape  both  the
reality and the electorate. The third, the core topic and the case study of
the analysis: the League, its leadership, its rhetoric and the role in the
Italian national framework.
The electoral success of the far-right in Western Europe
Among the Western European countries, Italy has recently observed a
rapid  and  incredible  growth  in  the  support  of  the  radical  right  and
populist movements. On one side, some academics stated that PRR in
Western Europe are representing only a mere niche of the electorate
(Immerzeel  and Pickup 2015).  However,  between  2013 (year  of  the
second-to-last  parliamentary  elections)  and  2018  (year  of  the  last
parliamentary elections), the most prominent far-right Italian party, the
League, was able to pass from the initial 4.09% to a stunning 17.35%
mostly  because  of  the  shift  toward  the  Western  far  right  parties’
ideologies.  One  of  the  main  examples  is  Alternative  for  Germany
(AfD):  the  party  stepped  from  a  softly  Eurosceptic  party  to  PRR,
establishing the agenda on the anti-migrant  sentiment  and the ethnic
threat  of  the  so-called  “losers  of  the  modernization”  who  became
immediately the first supporters of AfD (Arzheimer, Berning 2019).
So far,  the  surge  of  those  PRR parties  has  been  studied  by  several
academics,  who  have  defined,  among  demographic  studies,  that  the
majority of the supporters of the far right belong from a specific class of
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the population: on one side, some argues that being male, young (under
25)  and part  of  the  so-called  blue  collar  workforce  or  with  a  lower
education increase the support toward PRR (Arzheimer, Carter 2006).
On the other side, although, some others argue that PRR may trigger the
electorate  only  once  reached  a  wider  consensus.  In  particular,
Immerzeel  and  Pickup (2015)  states that  the  difference  between the
PRR in West and East Europe lays on the factor that the majority of the
voters belong to the middle class and have a higher education. To sum
up,  there  is  no  correlation  between  PRR’s  electorate  description  of
Arzheimer  and  Carter,  but  it  emerges  as  a  very  vague  and  unusual
variation  of  the  results  when it  comes  to  the  support  on  PRR.  This
division  has  emerged  over  decades  of  studies  on  macro  and  micro
variables of the PRR. Despite many efforts have been made, most of the
studies converge on the central and pivotal role of nativism and the anti-
migrant  behaviour  of  both  the  voters  and  the  party  leadership
(Arzheimer 2018).
However,  diverse  other  characteristics  have  been  underlined  by
academics, it is important to quote the inclination of the voters against
the  bribe  and corruption  issues  or  the  unemployment  rate  and other
economic issues along with political  issues (Immerzel, Pickup 2015).
Along with the social and economic conditions of the voters, another
variable  that plays a very pivotal  role in the political  factors are the
political speeches and discourses of the parties leaders, that are mostly
affected by rhetorical manipulation of the politicians (Arzheimer 2011).
Furthermore,  as  stated by Coffè et  al  (2007),  the PRR parties  result
positively  affected  by  the  increase  of  numbers  of  migrants,  and  in
particular by the Islamic fear given according to the rhetoric and the
narratives  of  the  right-wing  parties.  In  addition,  Stockemer  (2017)
argues that the capacity of the moderator, the rhetoric and narrative of
the PRR is fundamental to foresee the future of the radical right for two
reasons: because they “keep the voters and they re-attract those, who
have been drifting to the fringes” (p. 52).
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To sum up, on one hand, there are no perfect recipe for far-right to be
successful, but in countries where there are some specific attitudes of
the  population  in  questions  like  nativsm  and  souverainism  is  more
possible  to  witness  to  the  growth  of  PRR  parties.  Examples  are
countries  like  Italy,  Germany,  Austria  or  Switzerland.  On  the  other
hand, years of studies on electoral outcomes would not be able to state a
perfect definition of the PRR voter because of inconsistent examples in
Europe as well as in America.
The history of the League, from regional populist party to national
sovereignist party
The  case  taken  into  consideration  in  this  dissertation  reflects  those
features clearly in its statements and policy behaviour: the League or as
known to  Italian  electorate  Lega Salvini  Premier.  This  is  the  actual
oldest  party in  the Italian  frame.  It  was  funded in the early  nineties
(1991) and it has – at present – gathered the majority of the favours of
the  Italian  voters  under  the  leadership  of  the  new secretary  Matteo
Salvini. 
At the beginning, the Northern League was born as an anti-fascist, pro-
North, federalist party aimed to pursue the instances of the northerner
population, and it remained particularly bounded to this legacy until the
rise to the secretariat of Matteo Salvini in 2013. Under his leadership,
the League has  seen a drastic  shift  towards new political  issues and
social matters. Along with the removal of the term “Northern” from the
name,  the  League  has  transformed  itself  into  an  anti-establishment,
populist radical and anti-globalization party, introducing in the political
frame the concept and the doctrine of souverainism and increasing the
already existing populist patterns.
As demonstrated by the accurate work of Albertazzi et al (2018) on the
content  analysis  of  the  leader’s  social  network  usage,  the  League
experienced a rapid and drastic shift in its identity. At the beginning, it
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was  defined  as  a  regional  populist  party  (McDonnell  2006  and
Albertazzi at all 2018) born with the mere interest of gathering the pro-
independence movements of the northern regions, like Lega Lombarda
in  Lombardy,  Liga  Veneta  in  Veneto  and  Union  Piemontèisa in
Piedmont. The early success of the Northern League was led by two
main  discourses  brought  to  the  national  agenda:  the  economic  and
social  gap  between  North  and  South,  and  the  anti-establishment
positions  towards  Italian  institutions  and  “corrupted  party”  system
symbolised with the image of Roma Ladrona (Rome is a rogue) (Bulli
and Tronconi 2011 and Albertazzi at all 2018). By extension, it is clear
that  the  early  Lega  Nord  (LN)  positions  were  characterised  by  a
regional exclusivity (De Winter 1998) and advocating to the issues and
instances of the northern regions, they put a clear divisive line between
the North and the South of the country (Albertazzi and all 2018) and by
a  very  strong  populist  statements.  Indeed,  the  only  one  patter  that
remained  after  the  shift  is  the  latter.  Once  the  previous  leader  and
secretary Umberto Bossi was forced to resign due to a reimbursement
scandal, and after a short period of transition, Matteo Salvini took the
leadership of the party in late 2013. As argued by Vercesi (2015), the
step undertaken by the new party governance was unprecedented and an
inevitable shift toward institutionalization.
The adjustments  were clear from the very beginning; indeed, Salvini
identified the new enemy no more in the Roman establishment, but in
the  European  and  in  particular  in  the  German  leadership  of  the
European Union. Thus, a second and very pivotal change occurred in
the  focuses  and  the  frames  in  which  the  League  could  manoeuvre.
Despite  the  opposition  of  the older  establishment,  Salvini  turned his
interest  toward  the  South  and  saw  Italy  as  a  mere  unity.  As  a
consequence,  one  of  the  funding  pillars  fell:  the  regionalism  and
autonomy instances (Albertazzi and all 2018) and along with it also a
minority  of  the  most  resilient  members  of  the  party  old  guard  left.
Despite this relatively irrelevant schism, the Salvini’s League realised
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its best results in the elections of 2018, surpassing the historical partner
Forza  Italia  and  shadowing  it  in  the  European  elections  of  2019,
marking the final step to be recognised as the party leading the Italian
right coalition.
To move toward a nationalization of the party can be considered the
trump card  of  the  entire  Salvini  politics,  indeed  –  according  to  the
statistics, the League became the second most-voted party in the South
of  Italy  beside  the  5  Stars  Movement  in  the  European  Parliament
elections in 2019. An astonishing result, considering the fact, that the
year before the League reached 6% of the preferences in the national
elections  in  the  same  regions  and  in  direct  opposition  with  the
statements  that  consider  the  League  dead  after  Bossi.  (Bulli  and
Tronconi  2011)  However,  despite  several  authors  consider  the
personality of the leader the more consistent contribution to this result,
others argue that the winning formula is set on the ability of the League
to recruit local politicians in order to increase the national support and
consensus,  although the risk of a band-wagoning process can not be
neglected (Francillo and De Luca 2019).
To sum up, once the party gained the apex in European Parliamentary
elections (34,3% of Italian electorate), it did not stop. Then, in order to
geo-localize the position of the party in the political frame of Italy, it is
possible to consider the party according to the subclass of the far right
family developed by Ignazi (2003). The actual party governance led to
think it as populist radical right party. Despite it is possible to recognise
some  features  typical  both  of  the  far  right  and  a  strong  populist
behavior.  Furthermore,  taking into  consideration  the  divisions  of  the
radical  right  party  families  described  by  Mudde  (2000),  the  League
clearly displays a strong inclination to the other populist parties and the
government  resulted  with  the  5SM  is  a  direct  consequence  of  this
attitude. Finally, it is possible to state that the most important shift that
allowed  the  League  to  the  center-right  coalition  as  well  as  the
government  was the glance  toward the  South of  Italy.  This  must  be
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intended  as  the  real  turning  point  for  the  Salvini  experience  in  the
League’s leadership.
Far-right  rhetoric  and  Politics  of  fear,  the  League’s  new trump
card
In  order  to  explain  the  power  of  the  rhetoric,  it  is  mandatory  to
introduce and frame the figure of Matteo Salvini, secretary and political
head of  the  League,  who definitely  has  played a  crucial  role  in  the
growth  of  the  League’s  support  and  whose  figure  as  a  charismatic
leader cannot be negotiated. The leader’s role is critically important to
understand one of the most characterising features of the Far Right: the
authoritarian approach (de Lange 2007). And Salvini is the pragmatic
exception  that  confirms this  rule.  The success of the party has  been
studied to pass through the main figure and the leadership of the party,
indeed,  the  surge  of  the  Western  European  radical  right  parties  are
registered when the party itself is built and rapidly institutionalised. In
this pattern, the role of the party head is particularly important because
it  fasts  the  surge  to  success  (de  Lange,  Art  2011).  This  approach,
emerged in the study of the study of the Western radical right parties, is
applicable  within  the  party  by  the  leader.  Therefore,  studying  the
phenomena, de Lange (2007) and Kitschelt (1995) have isolated, as part
of the so-called “winning formula”, this approach as a central feature
for the radical right success. The authors argue that, in a broader change
of party systems in Western European countries, the winning formula
for PRR is, on one side, to maintain the authoritarian features typical of
80s and 90s,  but on the side,  to assume a more moderate  profile  on
collateral issues, as instance economy. In the case of the League, the
winning outcome is demonstrated by the fact that the growth in support
is  increasing  in  the  middle  and  lower  classes  of  the  population.
Moreover,  the  role  played  by Salvini  as  a  centraliser  of  power  and
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media target, shows the fact that the path overtook by the leadership and
governance of the League is the one described in the studies above.
Generally, far right discourses are based and organised on several and
distinguished layers and topics of interests mostly according to local or
regional  outcome,  so to  clearly  shape what  is  the League now, it  is
fundamental to reveal its nativist attitude. Within the PRR discourses’
frame, before the elections and during the period of government,  the
League  core  interests  were  the  internal  security,  the  recall  to
souverainism and the migration issue; all of these topics are dovetailed
to nativism. As demonstrated by Mudde (1999), the PRR distinguish
themselves in the political environment through two main features: the
strive for the recreation of mono-cultural and pure nation state, based on
homogeneity of the citizens and the xenophobic fear of invasion by the
foreigners.  Both  these  two  characteristics  were  largely  used  in  the
League  discourses  and  in  slogans  like  “prima  gli  italiani”  (Italians
first) and “stop invasione” (stop invasion). 
More precisely and as well summarised by Mudde (1999), the success
of  the  PRR  is  well  related  to  the  immigration  issue.  That  is  what
happens  among  people  who  live  in  the  regions  where  this  fear  of
immigrants’ invasion and the misperception of immigrants (in particular
those who do not have official  documents) are over proportioned: in
particular  the  peripheral  areas  in  Italy.  Indeed,  in  these  terms  it  is
possible to notice that there are Lombardy and Veneto, the two most
important  League strongholds,  that  count  the majority  of the asylum
seekers in Italy. As demonstrated by a study of Istituto Cattaneo (2017)
on perception and reality of the immigration issue, which reports the
data of the Eurobarometer, Italians are the European populations with
the  higher  misperception  of  the  migrant  population  with  +17.4%.
Correlated to this data, it is notable that the most sceptics toward the
migrants are the voters of the right and far right +32.4%. However, in
contrast  with the theories,  there is  the South of Italy that  shows the
higher  misperception  of  the  actual  situation.  Therefore,  the  data
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demonstrates that the larger is the density of migrants in the population,
the less is perceived the migrant phenomenon; and vice versa, the less
dense is the migrant population, the more the threat of the migrant issue
is perceived.
The final feature of PRR is the distrust in the political institutions and in
this case the distrust toward the European Union. As demonstrated by
Werts,  Scheepers,  Lubbers  (2013),  Euroscepticism is  the  third  most
important  explanation  for  the  success  of  the  far  right  in  Western
Europe, Italy is – indeed – not an exception. Within this feature, it is
important to mention the strong campaign of Matteo Salvini against the
European  Union,  in  particular  against  the  Brussels’  elite  and  the
Franco-German axis. Those two European countries are considered the
main rival for the Italian sovereignty. Several claims took place during
the electoral  campaign and during 2019 and many times the League
leader challenged the EU with the prospect of a cleavage within the EU
parliament, supporting the other far right and Eurosceptic parties across
the  continent.  This  political  positioning  has  its  roots  in  the  Bossi’s
legacy of policies and in earlier Salvini’s statements on the League’s
future direction.
To sum up, Salvini’s approach in the League’s rhetoric reflects the far-
right traces of Western European parties, in particular, the nativism in
its  form of souverainism and anti-migrant  and anti-Islam feeling.  To
some  extent,  it  finds  roots  in  Bossi’s  legacies,  but  he  applies  the
previous statements to a new view from the actual context and situation
through the use of fear and misperception. In addiction to this, Salvini
imports  the  Euroscepticism  we  well  as  the  previous  anti-national-
establishment.
The Italian electorate attitudes in 2018 elections.
 
Despite the Italian electorate appearing to be mostly secularised on topics
like migration crisis management and the role of the European Union in
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the Italian politics, there are some outcomes to be taken into consideration
to understand the vote and the voters in the 2018 election.
As stated by Cavallaro et  al.  (2018),  it  clearly emerged that  the Italian
blue-collar  working  class  has  the  majority  of  the  more  nativist  and
sovereignist  position  in  the  electoral  panorama.  In  addition  to  this,  the
study  highlights  that  the  outcome  of  the  elections  shows  a  particular
feature to summarise as follows: the higher is the education, the lower is
the support for parties of the League’s coalition (Ibid. pp. 118). To see
Tab.1
Differently with the previous elections, the League increased its pool of
voters  towards what  could have been considered the strongholds of the
other parties: public employees, unemployed and the youngsters.
Along with the shift of the voters toward populism and souverainism, the
election’s outcome had shown the attitudes of the voters: to what concern
the migration crisis, the theme has caught the interest as a primary issue in
the 31.9% of the voters. Among them, a 45.4% feels insecure when there is
a gathering of migrants and a 52% wants priority in services to the Italian
citizens (pp. 124).
A second item observable is the attitude toward the European Union and
the establishment in general: the statistics show that the Italian voters are
most willing to take back sovereignty from the EU than to leave the Union.
In particular, on one side, there is a consistent group of over-65 who are
the more worried about an eventual Italexit (61%), while on the other side
the youngsters (25-34 y.o.) are more polarizing when it comes to leaving
option (pp. 126). To see Tab.2
Generally,  there  are  two new large  groups  of  voters  who are  the  most
polarising  in  terms  of  souverainism  and  anti-migration  sentiment  that
previously  did  not:  housekeepers  and  unemployed.  But  finally,  “the
category, which more strongly follows the souverainist shift and the anti-
migrant  attitude,  remains  the blue-collar  workers,  the same that  are  the
more hostile towards the cosmopolitan values” (Ibid. pp. 134).
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Demand of the Italian electorate, the supply of the League
To explain the success of the PRR in Italy, it must be introduced the
literature behind the supply and demand of the PRR. Unfortunately, it is
not enough to state that “Far right is sexy” (Bale, 2012 pp. 1) to explain
the development of the PRR electorate.
On one side, the demand side is related to the electorate and it generally
focuses on the economic and socio cultural trends, mostly standing from
a negative point of view towards them. On the other side, the supply
side is linked with the ability to address the needs of the populations.
Most of the time, the capability of the PRR is to capture those needs and
build a stable and reliable rhetoric on it.
To explain the demand side it is necessary to take into consideration the
work of Cas Mudde (2007, 9-10), he divides the demand into levels of
explanations: macro-level and micro-level. Despite this categorization,
the author realised that, first of all there is no result of success for PRR
even though all the levels are successful, at the same time and secondly
the author stated there is a lack of study regarding how macro-level
influences the micro-level.
As part of the macro-level, Mudde focuses on a few items: the first one
is the modernization (and to a larger degree the globalization) (Allen
2007, Cavallero and Zanetti 2020, Mudde 2007) and its effects. As a
matter  of  fact,  the  PRR are  very  attentive  to  the  electors  who were
defeated by the consequences of modernization, the so-called “losers of
modernization”  (or  globalisation).  Moreover,  the  effects  of
modernization (contained in small-N studies) support the theory that the
losers are the most vulnerable and affected by the PRR rhetoric (Mudde
2007, pp 204). A second item is the crises: according with the author,
there  are  two  types  of  crises,  the  economic  and  the  political.  PRR
occurs  always  at  least  after  one  of  those  two  types  of  crises,  this
position  is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  in  Post-communist  Eastern
Europe  PRR  are  not  as  successful  as  in  the  West.  Moreover,  as
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demonstrated by De Spiegeleire et al (2017, pp. 45), “the timeframe for
the  rise  of  populist  souverainism  correlates  with  the  increase  of
economic insecurity and inequality”.
Furthermore,  a  correlation  has  been discovered  between the level  of
“cartelization” of a state (signifying that the base system is funded on
clientele  and  corruption)  and  the  political  dissatisfaction  with  the
success  of  PRR.  A third  item part  of  the  macro-level  is  the  ethnic
backlash,  and  it  is  in  this  item  that  it  is  possible  to  find  the  anti-
migration  sentiment  and  nativism.  In  Western  Europe,  ethnic
nationalism has already reached the dominant  political  force (Mudde
2007, pp. 211) and a confirmation has been done by a strong correlation
between the number of foreign-born citizens and the success of the PRR
(Golder 2003, Norris and Ingleheart 2016).
Whether  the macro-level  focuses on general  issues,  which affect  the
PRR successful (or unsuccessful) trend, the micro-level focuses mostly
on the electorate's contribution to the success. It has been observed that
the majority of the voters of PRR hold radical right views, however the
majority of the extreme right wing voters vote for the mainstream party.
Moreover, as Mudde states, at mass level, the voters of PRR are more
moved by an  anti-establishment  sentiment,  rather  than keeping a  far
right position. Indeed, the author assumes that the major characteristic
of the voters should be insecurity. This insecurity must be intended as a
larger sentiment, which comprehends “identity, job and life [insecurity]
as a whole” (Ibid. pp. 223, De Spiegeleire et al 2017). Unfortunately
there  are  positions,  which  invalidate  this  view,  indeed,  Norris  and
Inglehart  (2016)  state  that  PRR  does  not  receive  higher  support  in
countries  with  high  unemployment,  rather  in  egalitarian  and
economically secure countries.
The position assumed by Mudde and the counter position of Norris and
Inglehart could be summarised in the following assertion: there is no
homogenous electorate  for PRR, rather there are different  electorates
according to the country the voters belong to.
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After  this  general  framework  regarding  the  demand-side,  it  is  now
necessary to explain the supply-side. This pattern is itself divided into
external and internal factors, which have different meanings but both
are equally fundamental to understanding the growth of PRR.
The external factors are, as evidenced by the name, non inherent to PRR
itself,  but  are  represented  by  the  political  opportunities,  in  terms  of
structure  of  political  environment,  which  a  PRR could  undertake  in
order  to  gain  popularity.  On  one  side,  the  political  opportunity
structures, however they play a more important role when there is PRR
breakthrough rather than when the party needs electorate maintenance,
since  the  support  of  the  political  systems  has  decreased  in  the  past
decades (Foa and Mounk 2016) leaving space for PRR surges. On the
other, there are other two interesting variables, which can amplify the
growth of PRR: at cultural level, the presence of fascist past increased
the effect of the nativist subculture and the PRR support; and the media
coverage  that  can  encourage  or  obstruct  the  electoral  breakthrough,
creating a new or renewed image of the PRR party.
The internal factors for the supply-side considers the role of the party
itself as a major factor for the explanation of success and failure of PRR
(Mudde  2007).  Indeed,  there  are  three  most  important  sub-factors
presented  for  such  an  explanation:  the  party  ideology,  the  party
leadership and the organization. Since, few theoretical frameworks have
been developed to  understand the  role  of  the  internal  supply-side  in
PRR, it  will  be the aim of this thesis  to expand it  within the Italian
frame. Indeed, through the means of the professional propaganda, and
the study of the discourses of Matteo Salvini,  a new form of unique
Italian  PRR would  be  developed  under  the  banner  of  Salvinism (or
Salvinismo). 
The phenomenon of Salvinism is specifically  restricted to a historical
moment  in the Italian  frame.  Indeed,  the discourses of  the League’s
leader are the quintessence of Salvinism because they are the conditio
sine qua non we can not talk about the surge of souverainism in Italy.
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Based  on  blurred  ideology,  a  wider  content  pool  and  an  easy
vocabulary,  Salvini  is  able  to  match  the  macro  effects  described  by
Mudde, with the outcome of the Italian electorate demand described in
the  Tab  1 and  2.  The  bravura of  Salvini  can  be  summarize  as  the
capability  to  capture  the  needs  of  the  electorate,  the  trends,  and  to
transform them accordingly to his simple rhetoric made of easy answers
to  difficult  issues.  Finally,  in  this  process,  the  voters’  concerns  are
mostly endogenously formed because they are the result of the macro-
level  occurrences (economic  and  migration  crisis,  globalization  and
modernization above all).
Framing populist radical right and souverainism
There is a great deal of confusion regarding the definition of what are
the characteristics that really represent the PRR parties and it must be
admitted that despite a tremendous job has been done so far in order to
frame  with  the  best  definition  the  PRR,  we  are  very  far  to  a  clear
definition, which meets the majority of the academics’ needs. 
Despite this discouraging introduction, Mudde (2007) stated that it is
possible  to  identify  three  recurring  core  concepts  that  allow  the
admission of a party into the PRR pantheon: nativism, authoritarianism
and  populism.  Those  three  concepts  allow  Mudde  to  diversify  two
separated  types  of  PRR:  the  mere  radical  right  party  (based  on  an
opposition to liberal democracy) and the temporary radical right party
(a reflection of the populist momentum). 
Another  author,  along  the  same  line,  wisely  claimed  that  PRR  are
characterised  by  a  diffuse  sentiment  of  dissatisfaction  toward  the
institutions,  showing several  characters  of  both  the  radical  right  and
populism.  So,  as  summarised  by Ignazi,  those  parties  count  on  “the
anxiety sentiment of the population […] are ideologically on the right,
with  anti-systemic  orientation,  and  claiming  to  be  speaking  for  the
mainstream  of  society,  to  what  concern  the  organization,  they  are
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strongly  characterised  by  a  centralised  structure  with  a  charismatic
leadership” (Ignazi 2003, pp. 35).
However, as claimed by Mudde (2007, pp.41) “it is not easy to pinpoint
exactly when a party is in which party family”, but in this following
chapter I will try to geo-localise the League within the plethora of PRR
parties.
Given the above definitions of PRR, it is now the time to introduce the
environment in which the analysis  would be taken: the current Italy.
Italy has addressed the outcome of the Great Recession in a peculiar
way, in fact, between 2008 and 2011, two governments alternated each
other:  Berlusconi  IV  and  Monti  I.  In  this  period  the  then  Northern
League (LN) played the role of the ally in a coalition government with
Berlusconi’s party first and the opposition role in the second course. In
its discourses about the economic crisis, the party presented itself as a
saviour and restorer of the lost sovereignty of the people victims of the
elites, who are also known as the “losers of modernization” (Scheve and
Slaughter 2004, Allen 2017, Cavallaro and Zanetti 2020). This role was
emphasized during Monti’s technocratic government. As demonstrated
by  Kriesi  &  Pappas  (2015),  the  economic  crisis  corresponded  to  a
political crisis, and as an outcome of these crises there was an erosion
of  the trust  toward the  parliament  and the political  institutions.  It  is
interesting to highlight that in the statements of that time the League
strengthened  its  position  against  globalization  and  the  unfair
competition of China and Eastern Europe countries. As also supported
by Saull (2015), this anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalization attitude
“has provided the key structural context and the social space for the far-
right  to  manage  to  take  advantages''.  This  approach  can  also  be
considered populist as populist can be considered the initial anti-Rome
and the actual anti-Brussels behaviour of the Northern League (Kriesi,
Pappas  2015).  The case  of  the  League  is  relevant  because  it  shows
clearly  another  tenet:  sovereignist  doctrine,  that  is  –  indeed  –
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intrinsically  dovetailed  with  the  populist  claims  (Basile,  Borri  &
Verzichelli, 2019). 
The actual Italian situation left space and possibilities for the populist
souverainism  to  grow  and  thrive.  Indeed,  it  is  necessary  to  briefly
introduce what is intended as populist souverainism theory. To begin,
authors  claim  that  “populist  souverainism  is  a  new  term”  (De
Spiegeleire et al 2017, pp. 36), therefore as a phenomenon is still under
investigation.  However,  since  the  phenomenon  could  be  considered
already  mainstream,  De  Spiegeleire  et  al.  have  summarised  few
recurring  characteristic  that  define  the  core  theories  of  the  populist
sovereignism:
1. They  emphasize  the  dichotomy  between  the  “us”  and  the
“others”  (Mudde,  2007),  where  the  “other”  might  be  the
corrupted elite or the migrants, alternatively all those non-part of
the “nation” as whole, seen as a cause of the reduction of the
national welfare.
2. There is a continuous claim on the legitimacy of the will of the
“people”, who represent the core aim of the policies.
3. They position  themselves  as  outsiders  in  front  of  the  already
established  elite  and  establishment.  This  allows  the  party  a
special status of breakthrough.
4. The political interest is focused on the national environment and
the priority is the will of the “people”. (Parthonnaud, 2016)
5. They  state  that  the  national  law  is  prior  compared  to  the
international law.
Despite  the  above-mentioned  work  of  De  Spiegeleire  et  al,  and  as
supported by Verzichelli (2019), populism and souverainism have been
studied  as  separated  phenomena,  but  they  could  be  considered  an
overlapping and mutually complementary phenomena whether they are
studied together.
Returning  on  the  analysis  of  the  League,  and  along  with  the  anti-
migration feature that substitute the Southern Italians as “outer group”,
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typical of the early League’s political discourses, the more recent claim
of the new leader Matteo Salvini allowed the shift of the party toward a
heavy  demand  of  national  sovereignty.  Therefore,  the  League  has
assumed a new populist façade embodying the instances of the weak
mid-lower  class  Italian  worker  in  front  of  the  harsh  overcome  of
globalisation.
What this study is going to pursue is to consider both these ideas as a
final and single outcome occurred in the Northern League. The League
itself  has  embodied  both  these  two  behaviours  (nativism  and
souverainism)  in  order  to  gain  popularity,  support  and power  in  the
national and European frames between 2013 and 2019. Thus and most
recently, the political counterparts of the League accused the leader and
the follower to be fascist, to a certain extent it is possible to find some
of  the  features  that  Umberto  Eco  listed  in  1995  (and  reported  in  a
posthumously  published  pamphlet,  2018)  of  the  Ur-fascism  (or  the
continuous  fascism).  Indeed,  the  cult  of  the  nativist  tradition,  the
dichotomous tolerance and refuse of modernity, the frustration of the
individual, the cult of the victory and the rejection of pacifism (the so-
called buonisti) are definitely characteristics that can link the League to
a fascist quintessence.
Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the party was able to operate
with the most useful patterns of populism and souverainism with the
final  outcome  of  setting  a  coalition  government  with  the  5  Star
Movement (M5S) for leading the country and solve problems giving
shared solutions. Indeed, during the last legislature (namely Conte I),
the League was able not only to trump the M5S’s political agenda, but
also  to  increase  its  popularity  among  the  voters  from  17.35%
(Parliamentary elections outcome in 2018) to 34.3% (EUP elections in
2019).
To summarize, the League under the leadership of Matteo Salvini have
completed  the  transformation  from a  niche  party  to  a  national  party
belonging to the plethora of PRR. The party reflects some patterns from
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the quintessence of fascism but it  has no reason to be called a neo-
fascist party since the populist and nativist nature are predominant.
Expectations
Through the method of the critical discourse analysis, that would be
discussed in the next methodological section, this thesis is expected to
display the effect of the Salvinism on the Italian electorate. As already
mentioned, the League’s leader played an undisputed role in shaping
the electorate’s perception of the reality. Analysing deeply the rhetoric
used, this thesis is supposed to show the impact of far-right rhetoric in
the  electoral  outcome.  To  do  so,  the  analysis  would  take  into
consideration  the  electoral  analysis  done  after  the  national  and
European parliamentary elections  of 2018 and 2019, in addition the
analysis of the Italian electorate would be taken into consideration for
tailoring the rhetoric topics exposed by Salvini. The recall to a stronger
sovereignty  and the  nativist  claims  are  the  strongholds  of  Salvini’s
speeches and undoubtedly they are supposed to play a major role in the
discourse analysis. This thesis has also the aim of demonstrate that the
PRR narrative is  not  only limited to those two arguments,  but it  is
deeper in themes and references. In addition, the capabilities of mutate
and change the form of the rhetoric as well as the importance of the
topics,  makes  Salvini  a  skilled  communicator.  But  the  fact  that  the
discourses rotate around the same themes demonstrates also that the
repetition and the insistence solidify the interest of the electorate and
its  support  and  that  the  trend  does  not  change,  if  the  rhetoric  on
souverainism and nativism remains.
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Methodology
Since data do not have a specific meaning for themselves and the meaning
is  always  a  constructed  meaning  (Schreier  2012),  in  this  thesis  an
interpretative  research  method  would  be  applied,  to  understand  how
Salvini shape a constructed meaning to his electorate. Indeed, in order to
understand  the  growth  of  “souverainism”  in  Italy  as  a  political
phenomenon, which leads to a specific outcome in the Italian elections, it
is  necessary to  focus  on the  analysis  of  the  Italian  electorate  nature  in
relation to the far right rhetorical outcome in the cultural perspective of the
electorate  during  the  past  five  years.  The  aim  of  such  interpretative
methods is to understand the subjective knowledge of the phenomenon,
which is the result of the intertwined reality represented in the forms the
object  and subject.  (Dalla  Porta  and Keating,  2008) In the case of  this
research, the sovereignty rhetoric of the far right is taken, as a premise, to
be intrinsically  linked with the  Italian  national  election’s  outcome after
2013.
More  precisely,  the  methodology  applied  in  this  research  concerns  the
critical  discourse analysis  (CDA).  This  approach will  be applied  to the
speeches of the League’s leader Matteo Salvini. Since the speeches of the
Salvini are the clearest vehicle of  disclosure of the political discourse of
the party, they are going to be addressed here in order to explain how the
far-right  rhetoric  cope  with  the  Italian  electorate’s  demand  on  more
sovereignty. Indeed, to use CDA in the election frame is not new: there are
several examples that resulted beneficial, as instance Aydin-Düzgit (2016)
was able to measure the impact of the language and discourses through a
critical constructivist stance. 
To  what  concerns  CDA,  the  references  for  the  analysis  are  mostly
collected  in  the  work  of  Wodak  and  Meyer  (2015)  about  the  critical
discourse  studies  (CDS).  Despite  the  precise  description  of  CDA  that
occurs in this work, it will introduce some features for this methodology in
order to explain why this pattern applies to this dissertation.
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As the central element of the analysis, the discourses are to be considered
as a form of social  practice used by politicians  in order to give rise to
power. The CDA is meant to be a problem-oriented approach focused, in
this  case,  on  the  rising  of  the  far-right  populism  in  Italian  political
scenario.  Thus,  the  use  and  the  expression  of  power  is  intended  and
perceived through a Foucauldian perspective: as mentioned above, it is a
manifestation  of  a  social  practice,  but  determined  as  a  social  structure,
indeed in this study the social practice are the Salvini’s speeches at League
Congresses and the social structure is the League’s electorate knowledge
and attitude. Discourses and power are dovetailed; in fact, discourses are a
representation of the reality given by the speaker. The more powerful he or
she is, the more valuable is the discourse. (Campbell 1992).
Along with power, the use of the language and the shape that is given to it
by  its  rhetoric  and  discourse  plays  an  important  role  in  CDA.  The
language, through its use, becomes entwined with power in several ways
and,  particularly,  its  use  can  challenge  the  power  and  it  becomes
particularly  helpful  to  subvert  the  power  –  rather  than  to  maintain  it.
Furthermore, the language is the main vehicle for the expression of power
in terms of a hierarchical social structure. (Campbell 1992).
CDS are not an established and precise methodology and there are several
approaches associated with them. Among them, there is CDA or as named
by Van Dijk (2009) the socio-cognitive approach to the discourse studies.
This problem-oriented and multidisciplinary approach has been frequently
applied to studies focused on the reproduction of the power abuse and the
resistance against it through the use of language. As it will discuss in the
following section, it fits this research since this approach is widely used to
address the rhetoric  and the political  discourses related to the far right.
Moreover, it helps to introduce the category of socio-cognitive structures
that exists in the voters: socio-cultural knowledge, attitudes and ideology
of  the  electorate.  (Van  Dijk,  2009).  Those  categories,  along  with  the
analysis  of the rhetoric  are the central  pivot around which the surge of
Salvini’s politics rotates.
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In the current and past decades, the rhetoric has been often addressed from
different perspectives. This linguistic tool is a credible commitment device
for the implementation  of  politics  and it  might  be used as a signal  for
information for the candidates’ preferences and appeal.  (Aragonès at all
2005). Furthermore, Conway et. al (2012) confirms that the use of both
complex or simple rhetoric in election frames can guide the result of the
elections itself. Indeed, the shift from a complex rhetoric to a simpler one
is more effective when it happens at the very end of the campaign. 
A more exhaustive study on the rhetoric and the elections’ outcome has
shown that the evocation of emotions is directly related to the result of a
higher consensus and mobilization around the party. Indeed, through the
approach explained by Riker (1990), it is possible to deduce that an in-
depth  study  of  the  words,  symbols  and  images  used  in  the  political
discourses may lead to a better comprehension of the growth of a party
rather than the other one. Further, a detection of the presence of specific
emotional patterns and the persistence of specific emotional themes (such
as the appeals to anger and fear) may also improve the connection between
the voters with the political elite. (Jerit, 2004)
Moreover, in relation to such a frame, it has been observed that rhetoric
styles are very often combined with political associations: in our case, as
demonstrated also in the study of Samuel-Azran et. al (2018), the far-right
rhetoric responds to 
 in order to establish the political  discourses.  As observed, “death fear,
dogmatism,  intolerance  of  ambiguity  is  positively  associated  with
conservatism” (Samuel-Azran et al. 2018, p.18) which is in tune with the
aim of this project that will show how this same pattern is present also in
Salvini’s political conferences and in Salvini’s discourses.
To  conclude,  this  research  will  focus  on  a  single-case  study  on  the
League’s  growth  through  the  analysis  of  several  public  and  official
speeches of the party’s leader crossing the whole surge until 2019: from
the beginning of the ascension to the success apex. The methodology that
will be used is the CDA also known as the socio-cognitive approach to
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CDS. For this reason, we are going to proceed here with a more in-depth
account of this approach.
 
Critical discourse analysis: the Socio-cognitive approach to CDS and
its application.
According  to  Wodak,  the  aim  of  the  critical  discourse  analysis  is  “to
understand the complex working of language within society, how socio-
cultural  structures  influence  and,  at  the  same  time,  are  influenced,  by
language use” (2015, p.24-26). In a more specific manner, what is going to
be addressed here is the close relation between the language and power, a
typical  object  of  study from the  CDA.  It  will  discuss  and  analyze  the
mechanism through which the far-right and the populist rhetoric of Salvini
is bound with the result of the elections, making the concept of power even
more tangible to be studied.
Furthermore,  language can also be used to legitimize power,  since “the
language  is  used  as  a  means  of  domination”  (Habermas  1977,  p.259),
hence  it  is  necessary  to  quote  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  CDA and
contextualize  them in the present  study.  The language used as a  social
phenomenon  in  this  dissertation  is,  as  mentioned  above,  the  far-right
rhetoric of League’s leader, who is speaking on behalf of the party he is
representing as well as of the social  group he belongs to.  The use of a
systematic and repetitive pattern in the language and in the rhetoric is the
focus of the analysis and the visible outcomes of polls and elections are the
result  of  effect  on  the  active  hearers  and  voters.  Furthermore,  the
centralization of power is one of the main characteristics of the League.
Indeed, it is tangible the undisputed presence of the leader in the party’s
activities (Ruzza 2004, p.6).
The concepts of power and language are mutually bounded, what emerges
from the academic is that despite the language is not powerful on its own,
but it needs the use of someone powerful to gain power, the language has
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the capability to engage with power and subvert it, providing the perfect
tool for this aim (Wodak 2011).
The choice to analyse the speeches in Pontida, the most important annual
convention organised by the League, and in the Federal Congresses have
to be discussed in  the terms  of  what  Weninger  suggests:  the  elites  the
characters  “play  a  major  role  in  shaping  the  public  opinion  and  the
production and maintenance of discriminatory and biased beliefs, attitudes
and ideologies”  (Weninger  2008 p.146).  Due to  the  strong hierarchical
conformation of the League, it is very simple to point out who represents
the  elite  of  the  party  and  what  represents  its  interest.  Here,  only  the
speeches taken by Matteo Salvini will be addressed - as he represents the
main figure and leadership not only of his party, but also of the majority of
the right-wing voters.
As mentioned in the previous section and following the lead of Van Dijk,
it is necessary to introduce three socio-cognitive structures that will aid the
comprehension of the phenomenon in question:
I. The socio-cultural knowledge of the League electorate that lay the
foundation in a very specific way and aid the constitution of a solid
pool  of  voters;  In  this  structure  it  is  not  possible  to  forget  to
mention the Eco’s concept of encyclopaedia (1986) as not a simple
codex  but  a  group  of  shared  information  among  a  cultural  or
subcultural group. 
II. The generally shared xenophobic attitude of the voters, particularly
towards the migrants and other members of the out-circle (which
will be discussed below);
III. The  ideology  and  the  continuous  claim  for  polarization  and
confrontation  with  “the  other”,  as  members  of  a  different  and
outsiders.
These three structures above are helpful in shaping the triangular socio-
cognitive account of the League discourse, in which it is possible to insert
the components of the political  rhetoric. So, we can here consider three
different patterns related:
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I. The racial component, embodied with the claim of “Italians first”
and characterized by the use of specific,  sovereign and populist
topics and arguments of the League;
II. The socially  shared ethic  prejudices  and ideology.  A traditional
and rephrased legacy of the previous (federalist) form of the party;
III. The reproduction of domination and inequality by the Italian group
of “good people” in relation to “the others” - such as the attitudes
towards migrants for instance.
Voters  and  political  leadership  are,  moreover,  bound  together  these
structures. Thus, it is possible to decompose and analyze each of the three
patterns above in order to better define, and understand the role that they
play in the turnout results.
Indeed,  the  voters’  knowledge  is  based  on  the  accumulation  of
information, with or without a racial component, that lasts a lifetime and it
is shared within a certain community. Also, it is possible to claim that the
political  elite  are  able  to  shape  the  non-experienced  knowledge,  also
known  as  hearsay  knowledge,  according  to  the  direction  taken  by  the
party’s leadership. Thus, the hearsay knowledge of the electors receives
inputs  that  are  considered  more  reliable  according  to  the  degree  of
importance of the interlocutor, which in the case of this research is played
by the higher ranked figure in the League panorama: the secretary of the
party, Salvini.
It is also necessary here to introduce some further concepts: attitudes and
ideology. They will be treated unitarily, since one is indispensable for the
existence  of  the  other  one:  “attitudes  tend  to  be  based  on  organised
ideologies,  that  control  the  acquisition  and  are  able  to  change  more
specifically  attitudes”  (Van  Dijk  2009,  p.68-69)  As  instance,  an  anti-
migration (racist) ideology might have different and highly unstable and
variable attitudes: on one side, one League voter might allow the migration
with  reserves,  while  on  the  other  side,  another  voter  might  go  for  a
completely prohibition of it.
32
The  most  recent  voters’  attitudes  had  already  been  mentioned  in  the
previous  theoretical  chapter,  however,  Passarelli  (2013)  previously
analysing the national electorate realised that “the League share [with its
voters]  a  set  of  beliefs  that  undermine  the  democratic  system” (p.  60),
moreover, quoting authors as Mudde, Ignazi and Mayer he assumed also
that “the attitudinal measure provide a considerable insight into individual
and group level of analysis” (p. 61). This gives me the chance to treat the
speeches both from a party’s point of view and from the electoral one.
Since  CDA  is  interested  in  the  study  of  power,  in  terms  of  abuse  or
domination of it, it is the aim of this study not to measure the exploitation
itself,  but  to  understand  how  the  discourse  can  exercise  power  in  the
election frame. To do so, I will set a specific database of discourses, which
will  be  presented  and  discussed  in  the  following  section,  and  I  will
decompose each of them into discourse components.
By doing so, I will address of the ideological structure of the discourse
according to the following sub-division, as suggested by Van Dijk (2009),
furthermore I will add some of the tools made by Gee (2014) in order to
validate  and  solidify  the  methodological  process  in  order  to  create  a
miscellaneous analysis structure based on six main points:
I. Polarization:  Are  there  any claims  regarding the  inner  or  outer
group? Are there any descriptions to those groups? Are pronouns
as  ‘we’,  ‘us’,  ‘our’  used  to  refer  to  inner-group  members  in
comparison with ‘they’, ‘them’, ‘theirs’? Is it used with a different
intonation that contributes to the polarization of subjects or topics?
How the use of languages is used to create a relationship between
speaker  and  listener?  How  is  the  “common  and  social  good”
created?
II. Use of  syntaxes  and register:  Are there  any uses  of  slogans or
mottos  and how often  are  they  used?  Are  there  any  figures  of
speech, if yes, what is the purpose of using them? What sort of
register  is  used  (high or  low/dialect)?  Does it  contribute  to  the
conversation in a positive or negative way?
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III. Identification: is there a main category used to describe the group?
If yes, how many times is it recalled and what is the function of it?
What is the speaker trying to communicate with the identification?
Why is it chosen a subject or topic rather than another one? Why is
the  subject/topic  designed  in  a  certain  grammatical  way?  Is  it
possible to recognize identities in terms of social/ethnic/religious
group?
IV. Use of vocabulary (or emphasis  of positive self-description and
negative  other-description):  Does  Matteo  Salvini  use  a
positive/neutral/negative  manner  to  refer  to  fellow  members?
What  about  the  reference  to  immigration  and  souverainism?
Which words are used to indicate the refugee-seekers? And which
words are used to indicate the opponents and the outsider group
members?  Does  it  use  any  form  of  hyperbolic  emphasis  (or
mitigation) in the language, if yes what is the subject of it? Is it
possible to extract a ranking of relevance of the topic?
V. Activities: How is the ideological group identified in terms of the
activities carried out by it? Does it propose any simple solutions to
the issues and problems mentioned? If yes, how are they reported
and proposed? Which language is used to describe them? Simple
or complex? Is it possible to recognize any scapegoat created  ad
hoc in the speeches?
VI. Shared knowledge: how is the party’s ideology described? Is there
a use of deixis (grammatical references)? What is it said, and most
importantly, what is not said in Matteo Salvini speeches? What is
it left to the speaker inference? What feeling and emotion emerge
from the context and what emerges from the speech? What is the
most common recall shared between the leader and the listeners?
Does the speaker  shape his own reality?  If  yes how? And is  it
effective?
Finally,  the  work  done  by  Wodak  (2015)  is  fundamental  to  explains
several features of the populist far-right discourses: for example i) the use
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of the  fear  of  the  voters  as  a  cause  of  the  shift  of  preferences;  ii)  the
creation of scapegoats to social and non-social issues; iii) the proposal of
easy  and  simple  solution  to  the  problems.  Indeed,  based  on  her  The
Politics of Fear (2015), I made some questions, above listed in the point
VI., in order to explore and analyse the discourses of Matteo Salvini. In
addition,  those above three points may recall  the phatic communication
prevalence theory of Sedda and Demurru (2018) and Sedda (2016). The
communicative style of the phatic language is more oriented toward the
presence  of  the  speaker  as  a  symbol  (figure  and  representation  of  an
ideology) rather than the real content of the language itself.
Consequently,  the  language,  which  can  be  divided  into  significant  and
significance,  used  in  the  far  right  rhetoric  of  Matteo  Salvini  loses
significance  in  what  can  be  described  as  a  phenomenon  of  empty
significance (Laclau 2005). As instance, the concept of Italianess used by
Salvini can change accordingly to the temporal and spatial location of the
speech. Who is Italian, who “comes first”, who is a “good person”, who is
the pacifist,  who is “we” and who is “the enemy” changes every single
time Salvini changes his audience, with the result that there is a completely
blurred  idea  of  what  it  is  important,  but  with  the  positive  outcome  of
creating a universal and shared-among-the-followers concept.
Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  highlight  the  exploitation  of  the  social
media by the League’s leader. Despite the media playing a significant role
in the whole analysis, this research is going to discuss the way in which the
populist far-right message is sent through the media and not the use of the
media themselves.
Database and sample
The  discourses  analysed  in  this  research  will  be  the  discourses  of  the
League’s leader Matteo Salvini in very specific circumstances and time.
Since,  as  reported  by  Wodak  (2001),  every  discourse  is  historically
interpreted and it is its situation in time and space that characterise it. It
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ordains the legitimisation of the power, in order to address the surge of the
Party as the most voted party, it is fundamental to start the analysis since
the party’s name mutation from the “Northern League” to the “League”
that happened right after the Federal Congress took office in 2017. This
very specific moment is the keystone of the whole change within the party
and the way through which it is perceived from outside.
Once  set  the  database,  applying  the  lenses  of  CDA,  the  study  will
considerate  how the public  speeches  are  implicated  in  the surge of  the
party, as the goal of the research is to shed light on the function of the
language in the outcome of Parliamentary elections of 2013 and 2018 and
the European elections of 2019.
In order to do so, the public speeches taken into consideration will be the
Salvini’s  speeches  at  the  Federal  Congress  of  the  League  in  2017 and
2019,  and  the  Salvini’s  speeches  taken  in  Pontida  during  the  annual
conference in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and Salvini’s speech in Piazza Duomo
in Milan for main conference of the League Prima l’Italia in May 2019.
The choice of using the public discourses, in particular in this transitional
period of the party, lies on the fact that political speeches are  per se the
most persuasive means used by politicians. Moreover, since the spotlight is
on the shift towards the souverainism of the party, the speeches are the
solid  pivotal  element  around which the transition  rotates.  Finally,  since
mostly the party followers attend the public speeches,  the use of social
media and the possibility to have access to the original record is largely
available,  but the analysis will be done on the above mentioned limited
number of speeches. Along with it, Matteo Salvini could be considered the
most influential politician in the social media frame in Italy, as instance his
profiles reached 60,8 million interactions during the EU Parliamentarian
campaign  lasting  from January  until  May 2019.  (Ravizza  & Gabanelli,
2019)
Those speeches are available on the official YouTube page of the League
or the official  YouTube page of Matteo Salvini,  allowing them to be a
reliable matter of study. Here the role of the mass media is tangible: not by
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chance, the League and Matteo Salvini use one of the most common social
means of communication in order to collect and record the speeches and
the clips for the electorate. Thus, the annex for the digital resources would
be added at the end of the next analysis chapter. 
Finally, since my mother language is Italian, I will provide a translation
and a contextualization of the language used in those discourses. Since, the
language used by Salvini during his rallies is Italian.
In order  to  better  introduce the analysis  that  follows, I  will  provide an
example of the work here below. The speech taken into consideration is
dated July 2015 and it is taken in Milan at convention namely “Euro o
libertà?” (Euro or freedom?). This episode is a very clear example of the
Salvini’s rhetoric against the European Union, thus this speech is pretty
simple  and  clear,  there  are  very  few crossing  topics  and  the  theme  is
mostly a single one.
To what  concern point I.  (Polarization),  the speech begins with a clear
stance of the gap between the Left (time wasters) and the “ugly, racist and
ignorant” Leghisti (League followers). Of course, the tone used describing
his followers is sarcastic, but this tone will not be a single case, but apply
several  times.  A  second  polarization  is  done  when  Salvini  divides  the
electorate and the voters between “people who want to understand” and
“obtuse  people”.  As  a  consequence  of  this  division,  the  government
members, who lead the country, are “obtuse people who act in bad faith,
because they are paid to pretend to not understand that we can leave [the
EU] and an alternative is possible''. A final polarization is done at the very
end of the speech, here Salvini is expressing his own position regarding his
ideology  and  accordingly  “I  make  first  the  person,  his  value  and  the
welfare, then it comes the spread, the trade and the finance, all those are
inventions made by the man to screw the man”. 
The syntaxes (II.) used has a real low profile as the register. In fact, the
speech is not empty of scurrilous words and foul language; it is possible to
hear che si fotta Berlusconi (fuck Berlusconi) or moneta del cazzo (shitty
money [related to Euro]) or una parte della sinista […] hanno le palle in
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spiaggia  (a  part  of  the  Left  […]  is  wetting  its  ass  on  the  seashore).
Secondly, Salvini’s speech is full of claims and motto as  o si vince o si
muore (there is a winner or dying) and again, la verità viene prima di tutto
(truth  comes  first)  or  sono  arrivati  ai  titoli  di  coda  (they  [the  leftist
government] arrived at the end of the path). In those mottos we notice that
the enemy is described both easily to defeat (because it arrived at the end)
and a strong opposite (because it needs someone ready to die). This is a
typical feature of the fascist rhetoric, the humiliation in front of the weak
enemy (Eco, 1995). Another feature typical of the fascist rhetoric is the
appeal to the frustrated moderate middle-class: io guardo ai moderati […]
che hanno perso i loro risparmi e non sono per un cazzo moderati (I look
at the moderates [who] loses all their savings, those are not moderated at
all). The register used contributes positively to the conversation, since the
listeners are supporters and voters of the leader, indeed the figure that uses
a  common,  dialectic  and  vulgar  syntax  appears  more  closer  and  more
attentive to the deeper needs of the person.
In the speech we have a first paradoxical identification (III.) of the League
voters  and  of  Matteo  Salvini  himself.  At  the  very  beginning,  Savini
describes in a sarcastic way the leghisti as brutti, razzisti e ignorati (ugly,
racist and ignorant), secondly, the target of his sarcasm is himself. Indeed,
he assume to be a math ignorant,  io che ho fatto il liceo classico e sono
stato rimandato in mate, but able to understand that the Euro is the wrong
currency  for  Italy,  because  le  disequazioni  non  fanno  chiudere  le
fabbriche, ma l’euro si (inequalities do not let the company to close, Euro
does).  A second blurred identification  occurs  toward the  “enemy”.  The
first  and  major  one  is  the  European  establishment  or  bestie  anti
democratiche  che  governano  l’Europa  (anti-democratic  beasts  that  run
Europe);  those  are  represented,  once  again,  with  sarcasm.  As  instance,
Salvini  states  that  the  authoritative  voice  of  Romano  Prodi  is  taking  a
discourse  for  the  disgraziati  (wretches)  students  of  Bologna  Business
School,  explaining  that  Euro  is  the  biggest  laboratory  in  the  post-war
period. With this classification, Salvini is able to compare the poor Italians
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as test subjects of the European establishment, making them feel victims of
the elite who surround the “ignorant and ugly” electors.
As  briefly  mentioned  above,  the  vocabulary  (IV.)  is  pretty  simple  and
mostly vulgar in its terms, the manner used to describe the fellow members
of the parties is pretty positive and creates a sort of comradeship between
the  “math  ignorant”  leader  and the  “ugly,  racist  leghisti”.  In  this  short
speech there is only one reference to different issues, aside the anti-Euro
topic: Salvini accuses the media of bad information regarding immigration
issue: Se muore un migrante su un barcone è una tragedia, se muore una
cavia non succede nulla (if a migrant dies on a boat is a tragedy, if a test
subject does, nothing happens).
At the end of the speeches Salvini enunciates his political and economical
solution (V.) for the Euro issue. In fact, he states i cinquanta miliardi? Io
te li metto di tasca mia per la libertà dei nostri figli (what about 50 billion?
I  will  pay  them  out  of  my  pocket  for  my  children’s  freedom),  li
ricostruiamo  come  residuo  fiscale  versato  dalla  Lombardia  allo  stato
italiano  (we will save them from per-capita fiscal balance of Lombardy
region).  In  this  circumstance,  it  emerges  clearly  as  a  legacy  with  the
Northern past of the party, the Lombardy once again is represented as the
stronghold  of  politics  and  economics  against  not  only  Italy  but  also
Europe. A brief consideration about the solution proposed, the analysis of
the  Italexit  is  not  complete  at  all  and  it  lacks  several  secondary  and
correlated issues, so the estimate of 50 billions is completely incorrect and
furthermore  it  is  not  supported  by  any  data.  This  is  fallacious  and
unreliable  information,  typical  of  PRR rhetoric.  Moreover,  the  solution
appears simple as simple is the language used, in particular when there is a
strong  emotional  relation  between  the  big  enemy  and  the  freedom  of
Italian and Lombard children.
To  what  concern  the  final  element  of  the  analysis  (VI.),  the  shared
knowledge, in this speech there is no straightforward utterance regarded
the ideology of the party, however there are few adjectives  that remind
how the League voter must be: honest, pride and courageous in front of the
39
anti-democratic beast. Moreover, despite no deixis being detected, Salvini
sarcastically  claims  that  the  Leftist  newspapers  are  cradle  for  pearls  of
wisdom, letting infer the incapability of journalists and the bad faith of the
Left.  Finally,  it  is  sustainable  that  the  leader  creates  his  own  reality
through the far-right rhetoric; weak but dangerous enemies thus surround




The choice  of  Pontida  speeches  as  a  matter  of  analysis  is  not  trivial,
indeed on the stage of the annual League congress of Pontida the leaders
of the League had the opportunity to talk to their voters. The location of
Pontida has symbolically been chosen because of the oath of Pontida: a
ceremony dated 7th April 1176, where the Lombard cities signed a pact
against the Holy Roman Empire. Every year, since 1990, the League uses
the anniversary of this ceremony to gather the Lombard people on the
“holy soil” and there, the leaders of the League take their speeches and
rallies.
Pontida 2017: Referendum and freedom
This  XXXI speech of Pontida was held in  September 2017 under  the
slogan Referendum and freedom. Salvini decided to use a particular form
of  speech  which  increases  the  grade  of  active  involvement  of  the
listeners, indeed, during the rally Salvini asked the audience a few yes/no
questions.
Starting with the polarization (I.), at the very beginning of the speech,
Salvini identifies his target audience,  the middle-Italian described as a
good person gente per bene.  During all the rally, when Salvini uses the
pronoun us,  we, our,  your,  and mine,  he takes  into consideration  this
good people's description. However, there are no defined lines of whether
a person is or is not good, but what emerges is that the League is a family
and not only a party, a family that reunites the good people. There are a
few descriptions of the bad people, the first one is a very broad concept
of the elite, it is geo-located both in Rome and in Brussels, and it consists
of bankers, speculators,  politicians,  and baby-boomers or  sessantottini.
These  discredits  are  very  broad  and  once  again  there  is  no  clear
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distinction of who is the real enemy, either the elitarian bureaucrats or the
socialist boomers. The second diversification comes versus the political
other, in particular the 5 Star Movement’s (5SM) politicians, who at that
time  are  the  rival  of  the  League.  The  tone  used  to  describe  them is
sarcastic and ironic, in particular, Salvini describes their leader, Luigi Di
Maio, as a small mushroom, il funghetto. The target of Salvini’s sarcasm
is also the 5SM’s voters, those who vote with a click and with a click
choose a “martian” mayor in Rome. The relationship created between the
listener  and  the  speaker  is  pretty  reoccurring,  the  fact  that  the  leader
claims as a family, with common values and identity strength the ideas
and  the  claims  of  Salvini  and  moreover  adding  features  and
characteristics  to  the  enemy,  along  with  the  use  of  sarcasm,  gives
confidence to the listeners who reflects him or herself within the figure of
the leader.
To what concerns the use of syntaxes and register (II.) Salvini uses his
common informal register with the presence of Lombard dialectal forms
scusate suü strach (I am sorry, I am tired). Moreover, it emerges from his
words a pretty optimistic  behavior,  amplified by sentences  like  l’anno
prossimo quando andremo al governo (next year, when we will govern).
This  widely spread sense of  victory allows the audience  to  feel  more
participants and positive towards Salvini’s rhetoric. The speech is full of
mottos  and  slogans,  in  particular,  and  mostly  related  to  the  war,  the
defense, and the victory: c’è qualcuno di voi che ha paura? c’è qualcuno
che ha perso la voglia di combattere? (is there anyone who is afraid? is
there anyone who lost the desire to fight?). This register is used with the
mere aim of reinforcing the positions of the leadership and enhancing the
group  of  voters.  Furthermore,  Salvini  claims  to  a  peaceful  battle  for
freedom  from  mafia  (corrupted  elite)  and  clandestine  immigration.
Claiming the immigration issue in the opposite position put the League
voters to believe the migrants as enemies or a real threat to the value of
freedom. To emphasize the threat, not once, Salvini recalls the defense of
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the children and their  futures:  giù le mani dai bambini  (hands off  the
children).
Salvini displays a sort of identification (III.) for the League family. The
description is less vague than the enemies’ one, indeed the League people
are  nationwide  recognizable  with  some virtues  and  values:  gente  che
studia e fatica [...],  gente orgogliosa,  con dignità e senso di  giustizia
(people who study and toil [...] pride people, with dignity and sense of
justice). Anyway, more interesting is the description of the other: initially
Salvini states:  se sei immigrato per bene e arricchisci la mia comunità
allora  sei  benvnuto  (if  you  are  a  good  migrant  and  you  enrich  my
community, so you’re are welcome), se sei un clandestino che spaccia,
stupra, molesta e fa casino [...] ti mettiamo sul primo aereo per tornare a
casa tua  (if you are clandestine and you deal with drugs, rape, harras and
make trouble [...] then we will put on the first airplane which brings you
home). In addition,  se ti da fastidio il presepe o il crocifisso in classe
allora torna da dove sei arrivato (if you are bothered by the crib or the
crucifix  in  class,  come  to  your  country).  Salvini  in  this  description
characterizes  the  other  within  the  religious  frame:  those  who  are  not
Christian with Italian traditions are not welcomed in Italy. Along with the
use of war language, such a strong line of division between “we” and
“them” have the aim of fomenting the audience and to strengthen them to
the religion and its values.
To what concerns vocabulary (IV.), on one side Salvini uses a positive
and based on the values for describing the followers, on the other side the
vocabulary  for  migrants  is  matched  with the  words  like  rapist,  drugs,
harassment,  and  so  on.  Interesting  is  to  highlight  that  also  mafia  is
quoted,  but  with  neutral  vocabulary  and  no  particular  expression  of
detachment. So, it is possible to say that there is more interest in defining
the migrants as beatable enemies than the mafia as an instance. Another
different vocabulary is used to describe the political enemy: two are the
uses,  a  strong and violent  one  against  EU  massacra  i  nostri  prodotti
(which destroys our products) and one more ironic towards the Italian
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establishment,  in  this  case,  Renzi’s  government:  truffa  milioni  di
risparmiatori  italiani  con  il  salvabanche  (cheat  millions  of  Italian
depositors with the decree save-the-banks). Finally, some space is given
to the police and their jobs, in Salvini’s words it is possible to listen to a
winking language, indeed Salvini is giving all the freedom to the armed
forces to defend the citizens, without taking care of any responsibilities:
la divisa va onorata (the uniform must be honored) or darò mano libera
per poterci difendere per portare sicurezza, onestà e pulizia nelle nostre
città (I will give free hands [to the police] to defend us, to bring security
and cleansing in our cities).
In  this  speech,  there  is  no  description  of  activities  (V.)  of  the  party
followers, however, it is redundant the claim to values and Christianity.
To what concern the activities that would be carried out by the leader
once he will govern, we find a very clear trend that could be described as
a political program: abolizione della legge Mancino e della legge Fiano
(abolition of Mancino and Fiano laws, those are laws against the nazi-
fascist  propaganda),  cambieremo  la  legge  Fornero  (we  will  change
Fornero law on pension system), again  stop al jobsact  (stop the law on
jobs),  dobbiamo rivedere l’ordine dei giornalisti,  [...] c’è un problema
con  la  libertà  di  stampa (we  have  to  control  the  Association  of
journalists, [...] there must be a problem). When it comes to sovereignist
doctrine, Salvini claims vogliamo la possibilità di controllare la moneta,
le  banche,  i  porti,  il  diritto  al  lavoro  e  alla  pensione  (we  want  the
possibility to control the currency, the banks, the ports, and the right to
work and go to pension).
After what has been done so far, it is now possible to lead the analysis to
the shared knowledge (VI.) between Salvini and the listeners. Salvini’s
metonymies use the name of the laws instead of explaining the content, a
second inference occurs when Salvini states the crucifix and crib issues:
rispetto a chi porta rispetto, ma se ti da fastidio il presepe, il crocifisso
allora torni da dove sei arrivato (respect to whom respects, if you are
bothered by crib or crucifix then you came back where are you from).
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Here, it is possible to notice two interesting outcomes, the first one is that
with  claiming  the  catholic  traditions,  Salvini  indicates  as  enemies  all
those who are not Catholic and paint all them with the same brush of the
anti-Catholic  tradition.  In  particular,  Salvini  remembers  the  chronicle
relative to 2002 when a couple of parents inquired, with negative results,
the removal from a class of the crucifix. The reality shaped by the leader
is clear, the League family is surrounded by the enemies who want to
reduce freedom and eliminate the traditions, by a corrupted establishment
who stresses the entrepreneurs and destroys the products made in Italy.
The only one way to defeat this enemy is to vote for the League which
represents the true Italian catholic values of family, friendship, freedom,
identity, love for the country and its children.
Pontida 2018: Commonsense to govern
The  XXXII  Pontida  Congress  came  after  the  largest  victory  of  the
League in the Parliamentary Elections. After the elections happened in
March, the League received the mandate to form a government with the 5
Stars Movement. The Conte I government started the 1st of June, while
Salvini took his speech at Pontida one month later, on the 1st of July.
This was the first Pontida Conference with the League at the government
since 2011. During the election, the League gained 17.35% of the Italian
electorate  and set  itself  as the third most voted party in Italy,  beaside
5SM  and  the  Democratic  Party  (Dem).  After  a  long  negotiation,  the
League and the 5SM reached an agreement in order to govern together
and it is possible to listen to the faith and the optimism of Salvinin in his
first speech as a Minister of Internal Affairs.
Beginning with polarization (I.), in this case differently from the previous
year Salvini makes a clear distinction between the winners and the losers.
Indeed, the party family composed by the people of the League, which
finally has reached its nationwide structure, is able to run a government.
As the previous year, the party is described not only as a political form,
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but it is una comunità, una famiglia e un popolo che presto cambierà il
mondo (a community, a family and a population that soon will change the
world). At the apex of the pyramid there is the leadership, represented by
League ministers,  those who  abbiamo fatto  più noi in  un mese che il
governo in sei anni (have done more in one month than a government in
six years). On the other side of the polarized view of Salvini there are the
losers of the elections, those who are part of the opposition parties. As
usual, in the large outer-group of the losers there are  i radical chic che
commenteranno la  brutta  gente  che  c’era  a  Pontida,  [...],  i  poveretti
frustrati e disgraziati di sinistra, [...] i fenomeni di sinistra  (the radical
chic who will comment on the bad people attending Pontida, the poor
frustrated and wretches of the Left and the leftist champions (description
with sarcasm)).
To what concerns the use of the syntaxes and register (II.) it is possible to
notice that there is a relevant shift from the rally in 2017. Indeed, despite
it  is  present  again  some  forms  of  low  level  of  language  and  a  war
vocabulary,  the  register  is  definitely  more  optimistic  and  aimed  at
prompting  the  relationships  with  the  other  part  of  the  coalition
government.  Moved by the large victory in the election,  one one side
Salvini states that l’obiettivo è quello di cambiare l’Europa, di dar voce
ai popoli stroncati da [...] finanza, multinazionali che hanno offerto solo
precarietà e paura  (the aim is to change Europe, to give voice to the
people  panned  by  [...]  finance  and  corporations  which  offered  only
precariousness  and  fear).  On  the  other,  Salvini  opens  his  arms  to
friendship and love  qua c’è amore, non c’è invidia,  gelosia o rancore
[...] lasciamo che siano gli altri ad odiare, minacciare e rosicare  (here
there is love, there is no envy, no jealousy and no grudge [...] let the other
hate,  threat  and gnaw).  It  is  possible  to notice  one hyperbole used to
belittle the political target, namely pension law Fornerno, where Salvini
emphasizes the age to go to pension: 60, 70, 80, 90 anni (60, 70, 80, 90
y.o.).
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In  this  rally  as  in  the  other,  Salvini  makes  diversifications  in  the
identifications  (III.).  On  one  side,  he  uses  the  father-son  approach
towards his followers: i vostri figli sono come miei figli, e voi miei fratelli
e  sorelle  (your  sons  are  like  my sons,  and  you are  my brothers  and
sisters). And again sarò qui per fare un patto d’amore e onore su quello
che faremo [...] la gente della Lega è onesta e ha coraggio (I am here to
do a  love path and honor on what  we will  do [...]  we, people  of the
League are honest and courageous). On the other side, the approach to
the political opposition and the enemy is divisive, from Salvini’s word it
is  possible  to  infer  an  offensive  approach  towards  the  elites  and  in
particular the target of his attacks are Berlin, Paris and Brussels. Those
metonymies are used to not give landmarks to the listeners and to give a
larger  and  blurred  perception  of  the  enemy.  Indeed,  the  European
governments are accused of toglierci le radici, cancellare le donne e gli
uomini per avere numeri e consumatori al servizio delle multinazionali
(remove our roots, cancel men and women in order to have consumers at
the  mercy of  the  multinationals).  They are  also  accused of  benefiting
from the illegal activity of the NGO and from the immigration business,
furthermore, they also allow the untraditional islamic usage of cutting the
throat of the animals in order to let them bleed and then slaughter. This
very incoherent list of actions and causes increases the misperception of
the reality in the audience and has the consequences of increasing the
support towards the leadership since everyone reflects his or her thoughts
into Salvini’s ideas.
In this  rally it  is  possible to define four different  types of vocabulary
(IV.). The first one is the war vocabulary, the most used words belonging
to it are: difesa, sacrificio, onore, siamo in una guerra (defence, sacrifice,
honor and of course war). The use of this vocabulary strengthened the
position and the ideas of Salvini and the followers toward him. Indeed,
even  the  appelative  of  capitano (captan)  used  to  indicate  the  leader
belonged  to  the  military  and  war  vocabulary.  The  second  type  of
vocabulary, used in sentences where the League and the league’s people
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are the subject is the security vocabulary: here it is possible to notice
words as sicurezza, legge, ordine, giuste riforme, garanzia (security, law,
order, right reforms, warranty). This vocabulary increases the sentiment
of certainty and conviction. Anyway, the most interesting vocabulary is
the one used for the description of the enemy or the opposition: disperati,
poveretti,  frustrati,  disgraziati (desperate,  poor  people,  frustrated  and
wretches) are the people of the left, the journalists and Renzi’s followers.
As usual, the tone used is ironic and sarcastic, once more for mocking the
opposition. Finally, the last vocabulary is the one related to history and
legacy of the League:  grande genio, la voglia e il coraggio di Umberto
Bossi e Roberto Maroni (a huge genius, the desire and the courage of
Umberto  Bossi  and  Roberto  Maroni,  both  used  to  be  League’s
secretaries).  This  silver  tongue  used  by  Salvini  shows  a  sort  of
worshipping sentiment towards his predecessors and somehow displays a
continuous line in the leadership with the past, but it also underlines a
step forward of the League.
To what concerns the activities (V.) carried out from Salvini, during this
event it is possible to assist two actions of the leader, for the very first
time, Salvini approaches the so-called life tree of Pontida with the mother
of a former deputy, who died. He asks the followers to pray with him and
hug  the  mother  of  the  deputy,  showing  a  romantic  and  sweet  facade
before the rally. The claim to Catholicsm and religion happens not only
once, but three times. The second is a quote from the catechism, used to
justify his policies:  le nazioni più ricche sono tenute ad accogliere lo
straniero nei limiti del possibile, e io ritengo che i limiti  del possibile
siano  stati  raggiunti.  (the  richest  countries  are  liable  to  accept  the
foreigner in the limits of their possibilities, and I reckon that those limits
has already been reached). The final claim occurs at the end of the rally,
in this occasion Salvini pulls out a rosary and makes a promise to the
League’s people: farò che ciascuno possa nascere, crescere e curarsi nel
suo paese, felice ed orgoglioso (I let anyone to born, grew and heal in his
or her country, happy and pride).
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Finally,  and  once  again,  Salvini  shares  knowledge  (VI.)  with  his
followers,the first one to highlight is the tendency that journalists have to
call  the  leghisti  as  fascists,  racists,  nazis  or  xenophobes.  Once  more,
Salvini does mince his words and straightforwardly attach the order of
journalists  and  the  political  oppositors.  As  usual,  the  leader  uses  a
divisive approach in his speech to shape his form of reality, where what
counts more is not the words of the free press, but the thinker as Simon
Wiel, quoting her mottos as “the duties comes before the rights” or “ it is
criminal  everything that  has  the  effect  of  eradicate  a  human being or
prevent  he or  she takes  roots”.  Now, those quotes  and references  are
definitely unfamiliar  in Salvini’s  speeches,  however,  to  an unprepared
listener  it  seems a  stable  argumentation  and consolidates  the  ideas  of
Salvini in an upper level, motivated by a long-term thought.
Pontida 2019: Strength to be free
Only ten days after the establishment of the new government Conte II led
by the Democratic Party and the 5 Stars Movement, on 15th September
took place the XXXIII convention in Pontida. The optimistic spirit of the
previous year is not present anymore, but it seems reinvigorated Salvini’s
fervor in battling. The tone is less relaxed than the previous year and in
particular the political enemies gained the new trait of traitors. Interesting
is also the violence against the boat captain Carola Rackete, who accused
him  for  the  events  occured  in  June  and  July  2019  when  she  was
commanding  Sea-Watch  3,  a  boat  for  a  rescue  mission.  During  this
mission,  the NGO boat saved fifty-three African migrants docking the
boats during a special regime of “closed docks” ruled by the Minister of
Internal Affairs, Matteo Salvini.
Starting with polarization (I.), it is clear the feeling of distance with the
previous allies:  non cambierei mai la mia vita con quella di un Conte,
Renzi  e  di  Maio  qualunque  (I  will  never  change  my  life  with  some
random as Conte, Renzi or di Maio). Along with the already mentioned
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description  of  the  political  oppositions  in  the  past  two  Pontida
conventions,  the  Democratic  Party’s  politicians  are  categorised  as
poltronari (sit  on  the  armchair,  so  lazy  and  corrupted)  and  the  5SM
representatives  are  traditori and  governo  degli  inciuci  (traitors  and
government  of  the  corrupted business  deals).  As a  counterpart  to  this
corrupt government made by 5SM and democrats, Salvini claims: ci sarà
il governo del popolo (there will be the government of people). As usual
the government described by the League's leader is based on the value of
freedom, courage and patriotism. Those values and virtues, we learned,
are more and more taken to extreme by the words of contempt typical of
Salvini’s  rhetoric.  The  polarization,  in  this  case  happened  also  with
reference  to  the  policies  applied  by  Salvini  in  his  quasi-year  of
government,  indeed,  the  threat  of  delaying  his  security  decree  is
addressed with sentences of challenge: dovranno passare sui nostri corpi
(they will be over our bodies).
Once again, with respect to syntaxes and register (II.) Salvini continues
along the same lines of the previous years, he insists on prima gli italiani
(Italians first) and so on, but with one significant difference. In this 2019
speech,  Salvini  shows some indignation  towards  the  Democrats:  cosa
penserebbe Margaret Thatcher [...] di mettere una tassa sui prelievi sui
soldi  del  conto  corrente  in  banca?  la  follia!  (what  does  Margaret
Thatcher  [...]  do  about  the  taxation  on  withdraw  money  on  bank
accounts? it’s madness!). This sentence is also accompanied by an ironic
utterance: neanche in Venezuela riuscirebbero a pensare a tanto (nor in
Venezuela, they’ll be able to think it). In this example, it is interesting to
highlight the attempt to elevate the register, quoting Margaret Thatcher,
but at the same time, only one sentence later, the register is immediately
reduced to what the audience is used to listening to with an example like
Venezuela.  This  approach contributes  to  the  aim of  Salvini  to  appear
high-flown and at the same time with a solid basement in everyday life.
So, it is clear the positive contributions of this register to the rally.
50
The categorization and the identification (III.) go hand in hand with the
previous  years’  rallies,  there  is  a  Italy of  determined,  courageous and
patient  voters  seeking  future  and  work  for  them  and  their  voters
(determinati,  coraggiosi  e  pazienti).  The  introduction  of  patience  is  a
feature given by the actual situation of the League, indeed, the fact that
now is part of the opposition let the party act more on the rhetorical level
rather  than  on  the  administrative  level.  For  what  concerns  the  claim
Italian  first,  we  have  an  interesting  dichotomy:  per  italiani  intendo  i
fratelli e le sorelle arrivati dall’altra parte del mondo che rispettano la
legge,  pagano  le  tasse  e  rispettano  la  nostra  cultura.  Se  invece  vuoi
coprire tua moglie col burqa lo fai a casa tua, nel tuo paese! (as Italians I
consider all the brothers and sisters who came from the other side of the
world, who respect the laws, who pay the taxes and respect our culture.
But if you want to cover your wife with burqa, do it in your country!).
This  sentence  clearly  understands  who  are  the  target  of  Salvini’s
discriminations, however, he also leaves the doors open to whom may be
helpful to the country.
To  what  concerns  the  vocabulary  (IV.)  it  is  clear  in  this  speech  the
dichotomy between two types of vocabulary, the words of hate and the
words of sacredness. On one side, the hate vocabulary is characterized by
the common behaviour Salvini has against the political enemies and the
minorities. In particular, here in this occasion, Salvini railed against the
5SM calling them traitors, along with it, to argue his rhetoric he claims
also: gli schiavisti, razzisti e colonialisti oggi stanno solo a sinistra [...]
sfuttatori di donne e di uomini! (nowadays, slavers, racist and colonialists
are  leftists  [...]  exploiters  of  women and men).  Among them,  indeed,
Salvini  inserted also the figure of Carola Rackete  viziatella  comunista
[...]  novella  eroina della  sinistra  (little  spoiled communist  [...]  a new
heroine for the left). This rhetoric does nothing more than increasing the
media  and  public  opinion  pressure  on  the  forthcoming  trial  between
them. As a consequence, this rhetoric also creates polarization among the
audience. On the other side, the second vocabulary used is the sacredness
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and  tradition  related  one.  Typically,  Salvini  claims  that  the  League’s
people are tradiotion friendly, have dignity and pride, but this time, he
added  also  a  sphere  of  sacredness  to  his  speech,  indeed  he  claims:
difendere i sacri confini del nostro paese (to defend the sacred borders of
our country) suggesting that there will be a strong opposition for what
concerns the Mediterranean issues, migration firstly.
Regarding activities (V.), it is mentionable the introduction with which
Salvini jumps on the stage, the leader indeed is accompanied by the choir
of Puccini’s  Nessun Dorma with the iconic verse  all’alba vincerò!  (at
dawn I will win!). This choice is a clear reference to the aim of the party
leadership and also a separation with the past conferences, where it was
used a choir taken from Verdi’s Nabucco, typically used by the previous
League’s administration as a choir of resistance and independence.  As
happened the year before, Salvini dedicated some time for praying by the
life tree in order to remember the lost militants before the beginning of
the  rally.  During  the  speech,  he  carried  out  some  political  opinions
without  any  complex  explanations,  as  instance  faremo  una  legge
elettorale  che  dica:  chi  vince  governa,  basta  con  gli  inciucci  e  i
tradimenti, una legge trasparente ed efficiente (we will do a electoral law
efficient and transparent: who will win, will govern, stop corruption and
betrayal). The second proposal introduced without data supporting is the
flat  tax,  during  the  election  in  2018,  the  flat  tax  was  the  economic
backbone for the right coalition. So that, it is not a new topic introduced,
but it is the first time he claimed in Pontida an economical solution for
the Italian debt impasse. Of course, the tone and the vocabulary used for
this policy are commonly used.
Finally,  the  shared  knowledge  (VI.)  is  enriched  with  new quotes  and
figures,  becoming more complex.  The first  one to mention is  the war
memory:  i nostri nonni hanno dato la vita sul Piave  (our grandparents
gave their lives on the river Piave). Using the river Piave as a metonimya
allows the audience to remember the First World War where the Italians
were occupied in the war against  the Austrohungarian Empire  for the
52
restitution of the lands under the sacred borders in Trentino, Veneto and
Friuli-Venezia Giulia. A second shared knowledge comes when Salvini
commends  the  police  forces.  He  claims  that  when  there  is  a  League
congress  there  is  an  enorme  differenza  di  civiltà  (huge  difference  in
civilization). And, according to him, it is possible to see it in the police
approach: they are happy and smiley when there is a League convention,
and a counter-insurgery asset when the leftists protest.
Federal Congress of the League 2017: Free and Strong
The Federal Congress in 2017 held in Parma was the perfect occasion for
Salvini to celebrate his second mandate as secretary of the League and to
finally  break  the  chain  with  the  previous  party  establishment.  Indeed,
once largely won the party’s primaries against the candidate supported by
Maroni and Bossi, Giovanni Fava, Salvini may consider himself free to
undertake his path for the leadership of the party and the government. In
the Federal Congress are joined the majority of the mayors, governors
and politicians of the League, so the occasion is supposed to request a
more political  and less rhetorical speech, however as it  is going to be
displayed, Salvini decided to not follow the etiquette, and continues with
his typical rally, however with some differences.
To begin with polarization (I.), Salvini uses quite a lot of examples and
reasons to polarize his audience.  The first one is with the Democratic
Party:  il  PD  è  il  partito  degli  immigrati  e  delle  cooperative  che  li
sfruttano  (the Dem is the party of migrants and the cooperatives which
exploit them), Renzi è più tecnologico, ma noi siamo più puliti, onesti e
andiamo a testa alta (Renzi is more technological, but we are more clean,
honest  and we go head-on),  il  PD sfila  con  gli  immigrati  invasori  a
Milano  (the Democratic  Party is  parading in Milan on the side of the
migrants invasors), and again curiosa questa sinistra che abbassa le tasse
ai ricchi, noi vogliamo abbassarle a tutti le tasse (curious fact this Left
that  wants  to  decrease  taxation  to  the  richest,  we  want  to  decrease
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taxation  to  all).  The  second  polarization  occurs  versus  the  5  Stars
Movement: strizzano l’occhio al Vaticano per l’IMU sugli immobili della
Chiesa e hanno anche deciso di regalare 800 euro agli immigrati con il
reddito  di  cittadinanza  (they  wink to  the  Vatican  for  the  taxation  on
Church  estates  and  they  have  decided  to  present  800  euros  to  the
migrants with basic income) or again quelli che votano con i click (those
who  vote  with  clicks).  A  third  general  polarization  is  against  the
establishment and the elite, in this case there are two sub-polarization one
is the Italian state, the second is the European elite: i burocrati di Roma
(the Roman bureaucracy),  il  primo ladro in Italia,  è lo stato. Il primo
mafioso, lo stato! (the main thief in Italy is the state. The first mobster,
the state!) or il nostro portafoglio è a Berlino e i nostri confini dipendono
dai cretini di Bruxelles (our wallet is in Berlin and our borders depends
on the jerks in Brussels)  or  loro ci stanno provando ad imbavagliare
(they are trying to muzzle us). The aim of Salvini in those cases is to
create the widest range of enemies, so that all those who feel threatened
by any type of injustice (migrants, EU laws and so on) can find a safe
place within the League.
As the second instance, Salvini’s rally sees a standard use for syntaxes
and  registers  (II.):  it  is  possible  to  find  several  nationalist  mottos  as:
prima la nostra gente, prima gli italiani  (our people first, Italians first),
or comprare italiano, consumare italiano, assumere italiano (buy Italian,
consume Italian, hire Italian) or again non voglio clandestini in Italia! No
clandestini!  (I  do not  want clandestines  in Italy! No clandestines!).  A
second group of slogans is directed towards the party and himself, and in
this case they are display a opening feature: serve aria nuova, cerchiamo
qualcuno migliore di noi  (we need fresh air,  let’s find someone better
than us), or uniti si vince, io voglio unire, non dividere (united we win, I
want  to  unite  not  to  divide)  and again  includere,  aprire,  coinvolgere,
rispettare e crescere  (include, open, involve, respect and grow) or they
display some defensiveness:  siamo Davide contro Golia  (we are David
against Goliath). A third group of slogans is uncommon compared with
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the rallies in Pontida and it is more politically-oriented, indeed it displays
some party directions, directives and philosophies: pensare locale e agire
globale  (think local  and act  global)  and  l’articolo 1 della costituzione
dice che l’Italia è una repubblica fondata sul lavoro, io vorrei che fosse
una repubblica federale fondata sul lavoro davvero!  (the 1st article  of
Italian constitution states that Italy is a republic founded on work, I wish
it were a federal republic founded on work truly). The register used in the
rally  is  pretty  low  and  it  is  not  unusual  to  listen  to  cursing  and
blasphemy.  This type of register  is  a double-edge sword: it  positively
contributes  to  the  conversation  to  those  who  feel  represented  by  a
common and vulgar  language,  but at  the same time,  it  might  hurt the
sensibility of those who are annoyed by such a language. Once again the
aim of Salvini is to polarize his audience and to strengthen his followers
around his leader position.
To what concerns identification (III.) of the inner group, Salvini claims
few characteristics which classify the League and the Leghista: la Lega è
l’ultima speranza per un futuro sereno e normale (the League is the last
chance for a serene and normal future), or again  poi c’è la Lega che fa
scelte normali (then there is the League which takes normal choices), and
ovunque c’è una persona per bene, lì c’è la Lega con le sue risposte e le
sue soluzioni (everywhere there is a good person there is the League with
his answers and solutions),  noi abbiamo risorse e cuore che altri non
hanno  (we  have  resources  and  heart  that  anyone  else  does  not),  and
finally  noi  diamo  fastidio  ai  potenti  [...]  diciamo  cose  scomode  (we
annoy  the  powerful  people  [...]  we  say  uncomfortable  things).  What
Salvini aims to do is to describe the League as much normal as he can,
claiming  normality  above  anything  allows  the  leader’s  thoughts  and
actions to be understood as normal and shearable.
Along with syntaxes, another feature to understand Salvini’s rhetoric is
the  use  of  vocabulary  (IV.).  It  is  not  uncommon  to  listen  to  rude
vocabulary  and  low  degree  language  in  Salivini’s  rally,  but  in  this
specific  case,  the  vulgarity  seems  to  be  a  common  item:  Bossi  mi
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chiamava alle due del mattino per dirmi vaffanculo  (Bossi used to call
me at 2 am just to say me fuck you), Premio nobel per la coglioneria a
Romano  Prodi  (Nobel  Prize  fo  jerkiness  to  Romano  Prodi)  or  again,
Renzi, porta una fottutissima legge elettorale  (Renzi, please propone a
fucking  electoral  law).  Anyway,  what  is  more  interesting  is  the
systematic  linkage  of  the  word  migrants  (migranti)  and  invasors
(invasori)  or  clandestine  (clandestini).  Salvini,  indeed  creates  a  direct
association between those three words and he repeats it so many times,
that it is impossible for the listener to find differences and use them as
synonyms despite  they have  a  clear  different  meaning  and a  negative
connotation.  To what concerns the hyperboles, Salvini states:  quando ci
sono le marce in favore dei clandestini ci sono otto ore di collegamento
RAI, Mediaset, Sky e La7. Quando c’è il congresso della Lega, di riffa o
di raffa, due minuti vengono fuori (when there are marches in favour of
clandestines there are eight hours of live show on RAI, Mediaset, Sky
and La7.  When there is the League congress, by hook or by crook, two
minutes  pop  up).  This  claim  wants  to  highlight  the  unfair  treatment
reserved to the League by the mainstream news broadcasters.
Ideologically speaking, Salvini argues that the League and its militants
must carry out some activities (V.). As already mentioned above in the
syntaxes section,  the activists  need to be opened to all  those who can
improve the League in political terms, without a specific connotation or
collocation. Along with it, the leader stresses the urgencency to govern
and display some of his political positions starting with:  invertiremo la
tendenza [...] mille euro al mese ai disabili e se avanza qualcosa, ma non
penso avanzi  qualcosa,  a  chi  dice  di  scappare dalla  guerra  (we will
reverse this trend [...] 1000 euros to people with disabilities and if some
money are in surplus, but I don’t think so, we will give to those who says
are running away from the war). This sentence allows to introduce the
use of unreal news, indeed, the fact that Salvini does not argue with any
document or data in support, and the fact that he is perceived as a reliable
source of information, allow the listener to believe in his words. Another
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example  comes  up  with  flat  tax:  la  tassa  unica  al  15% funziona  in
quaranta paesi, anche Gentiloni la propone ai pensionati ricchi e agli
imprenditori ricchi che dall'estero ritornano in Italia  (the 15% flat tax
functions  well  in  forty countries,  even Gentiloni  – PM at  the time of
speech – proposes it to the rich pensioners and the investors who come
back to Italy from abroad).
The final point of the analysis is the shared knowledge (VI.). With few
statements, Salvini is able to flirt with the legacy and his rivals in the
primary  elections:  Bossi,  Maroni  and  Zaia  as  well.  He  also  uses  the
discourse direct addressed to Bossi: Umberto, noi ci abbiamo provato in
passato, ma andando al sud da colonizzatori, scegliendo qualche capo
bastone lombardo (Umberto, we already tried in the past, but we went in
the South like colonizers, and we use some Lombard as representative),
with this sentence Salvini rebukes the approach the Northern League had
with  the  South of  Italy  and at  the same time is  able  to  convince  the
audience that the direction he undertook is the right one for the victory.
Secondly,  he  said:  i  risultati  portati  a  casa  quando  siamo  stati  al
governo: Maroni e la lotto al terrorismo, il sostegno agli agricoltori di
Luca Zaia o la semplificazione di Calderoli  (the results achieved when
we were governing: Maroni and the fight against terrorism, the assistance
to the agricultures by Luca Zaia or the simplification done by Calderoli).
Once again Salvini is able to enlarge and flirt with his audience, those
who  voted  for  him  in  the  primary  and  those  who  voted  for  the  old
establishment nominee. 
Federal Congress of the League 2019
Differently from the previous public rallies, in this speech Salvini seems
to be very political and even mature. Indeed, this last analysis would be
an  important  example  of  the  transition  of  Salvinism and  the  leader’s
thought. The speech took place in December 2019 in Milan, Salvini had
just been notified to appear in court to give answers to his security decree
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when he was Minister of Internal Affairs and is part of the opposition of
the government namely Conte II. The tones of the speech are very strictes
and for the first time his aim is to reprimand his fellow colleagues. One
other important feature of the speech is the recognition of the status of
the  League  as  the  main  party  at  continental  level.  Indeed,  all  the
discourse rotates around this feature.
To begin, it is possible to recognize two types of polarization (I.), one
internal and one external. On one hand, the internal is definitely a new
pattern introduced by Salvini and it is related to the exceptionality of the
situation. For the first time indeed, he assumes a more inclusive status of
continental political force: qualcuno non ha capito che la guerra che c’è
è  a  livello  globale  e  sta  chiuso  nel  suo  orticello  (someone  has  not
understood that the war is a global war, and decided to not look beyond
his/her backyard) and again io qui ho visto litigi, pigrizia, ostinazione (I
saw  internal  quarrels,  laziness,  stubbornness).  So,  differently  from
before,  Salvini appeared to be more critical  towards his followers. On
another  hand,  the  classical  polarization  against  the  political  enemies
cannot miss: quando Beppe Grillo va all’ambasciata cinese, va a rendere
omaggio  a  quella  che  è  una  dittatura  (When  Beppe  Grillo  goes  to
Chinese embassy,  he goes paying tribute to a dictatorship),  and again
versus the Dem: Non tutti hanno lo stesso concetto della parola onore e
dignità, a loro gli lascio la poltrona e mi tengo l’onore e le manette se
serve,  a  testa  alta  in  tribunale  (not  everybody understands the words
honor and dignity, I let them the armchair and I take my honor and the
handcuff if needed, head on in tribunal).
To what concerns the syntaxes and register (II.),  the speech is rich in
mottos and slogans mostly belonging from two areas or semantic groups:
the war and freedom. Sentence as battaglia globale (global battle) or non
possiamo arrenderci (we can’t give up) as well as siamo in battaglia (we
are  in  a  battle)  they  do  nothing  but  increase  the  perception  of  being
actually in a state of war. This rhetoric goes right in what can be called
politics  of  fear.  The  second  group  of  words  is  related  to  freedom,  a
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typical  claim of  Salvini  and the League,  it  is  mostly  related  with the
souverainism and it  comprehends states  as:  la  libertà non è quella  di
avere un padrone giusto, ma di non avere un padrone (freedom does not
mean to have a rightful master, but rather to not having at all) and again
non esiste libertà senza libertà economica (there is no freedom without
economic freedom). Those two statements belong to different authors, by
Salvini's  own admission.  The  first  one  was  stated  by  Cicero  and  the
second  by  Margareth  Thatcher.  To  quote  a  well-known  historical
character is not a new pattern used by the League’s leader, but it gives
Salvini’s words an increased credibility and basement.
The new increased awareness of League’s role in Europe allows Salvini
to argue new identification (III.) for his followers. Indeed, he states: Non
siamo  qua  perché  siamo  più  bravi  degli  altri,  siamo  qua  perché  gli
italiani contano su di noi [...] siamo l’ultima ancora di salvezza per il
popolo cristiano occidentale (we are not here because we are better than
the others, we are here because Italians count on us [...] we are the last
lifeline  for  the  Western  Christian  people)  and again  dobbiamo essere
consapevoli che siamo il primo partito con questi valori [...] gli italiani
ci  chiedono di  essere dei  bravi  ed onesti  amministratori  (we must  be
aware that we are the first party with those values [...] Italians do ask us
to be good and honest administrators). Furthermore, a hooking to culture
allows  Salvini  to  claim  a  very  uncommon  state,  compared  with  the
previous  rallies:  la  Lega  deve  essere  avanguardia  e  strumento
protagonista [della cultura]  (the League must be avanguard and main
protagonist [of culture]). In addition to this new feature and awareness,
Salvini asks also to be: un movimento snello, orgoglioso delle sue radici
ma che guarda avanti (an efficient movement, pride of his roots but that
looks straight to the future), and again, talking about his work as Minister
of  Internal  affairs:  processare  qualcuno  che  ha  difeso  i  confini,  la
sicurezza, l’onore e la dignità del proprio paese è vergognoso per un
paese civile (to process someone who defended the borders, the security,
the honor and the dignity for its country is a shame for a civil country).
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As in syntaxes section, also the vocabulary (IV.) used in this rally may
belong  to  the  war  semantic  group:  battaglia  globale  (global  battle),
guerra (war), conquistare il mondo con la spada (conquer the world with
the sword). A second type of vocabulary is the cursing, what emerges is
that during the public speech in front of the electorers he alms bad words,
but in official and internal rallies like the Federal Congresses, the use of
swear is pretty redundant. Interesting to highlight is the combination of
the words islam and extremism. Every time Salvini calls for islam, no
room is given to  a different  interpretation,  indeed,  in  the listeners  the
islamic people are always intended as extremist when Salvini talks.
Regarding the activities (V.), in Salvini’s words it is possible to listen to
a large optimism. Indeed, the leader is pretty sure he will come back to
govern, but in this case there are no claims on sovereignty or anti-migrant
decree,  rather his invective is anti-establishment:  quando torneremo al
governo ci sarà la modifica della costituzione e cancelleremo i senatori a
vita (when we will come back to govern, we will change the constitution,
we will  cancel  the  life  senators’  offices)  and again  noi  vogliamo una
legge elettorale che garantisca governabilità, chi vince governa cinque
anni!  (we want an electoral law which ensures governability, who wins
will  govern five years!). In this rally, the scapegoat is not represented by
Brussels  or  Berlin  or  the migrants,  but  it  is  more closer,  and already
surrounding  the  League  people:  the  islamic  believers  and  the  Italian
government. For this reason, this rally plays an important role for the turn
of the League and lets suggest a possible new paradigm shift of Salvini
and the party.
Finally, despite there are no spotted deixes, in Salvini’s words the listener
may  infer  the  leader’s  innocence.  Indeed,  his  claims  of  what  he  did
during his mandate as the Internal Affairs minister, along with his anti-
establishment behaviour passes the message of sinlessness of action to
cope  with  a  higher  issue  or  problem  as  it  might  be  border  defence.
Certainly,  this  point  might  be  intended  as  Salvini’s  reality,  a  reality
where the actions of a minister can not be processed. A reality where an
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NGO  captain  is  represented  as  the  enemy  of  the  people  and  the
normality, where the League represents the common good and the future




In this section I will go through Salvini’s speeches analyses in order to
understand how the League leader  was able  to mutate  accordingly  the
events with a view to keep maintaining his leadership in the national and
the European frame. To do so, it is necessary to understand the impact of
the far-right rhetoric and the Salvinism tout cour.
The analyses showed three main differences occurring during the years:
the first one could be displayed as humoral shift. On one hand, Salvini
showed a strong combative spirit, typical of the far-right rhetoric, when
he was in front of elections or forced in his opposition position like in
Federal Congress 2019 and Pontida 2017. As a consequence of this, the
electorate showed him its support and strengthened his position, giving
him the energies needed to win political battles. On the other hand, after
an  electoral  victory,  like  in  Pontida  2018 and Pontida  2019,  a  strong
optimism  pervaded  the  words  and  the  rallies  of  Salvini.  As  a
consequence, along with the decreasing of the combative spirit in favor of
a more relaxed behavior (as admitted by Salvini himself), also the support
towards the League’s leader seems to decrease.
The second one is the change of register. Indeed, it is possible to assert
that the more the event is formal, like the Federal Congress, the more the
register is technical and rich in cursing. At the same time, the more the
event  is  informal,  like  Pontida,  the  more  Salvini  reduces  the  use  of
cursing,  but  also reduces  the level  of  language.  As a  consequence,  in
Pontida  speeches,  Salvini  shows a  bond with  his  supporters,  while  in
Federal  Congresses  he shows his  pivotal  role  as  a  leader.  Claims  and
flatterings with League’s legacies are contemplated as long as his role as
leader is.
More than a difference, the third observation is represented by what can
be  described  as  the  turning  point.  There  are  two  very  visible  turning
points, given by the results of the elections national and European. The
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first turning point is visible in Pontida 2018, Salvini moved towards the
new  League’s  cooperative  party,  5  Stars  Movement,  and  as  above
mentioned  the  optimism  is  palpable  in  Salvini’s  words.  The  second
turning point occurred one year later, in 2019, when the League lost its
position in the majority in Parliament, and all its ministers, but the results
of the Euro-Parliamentary elections saw him as the winner in Italy and in
Europe. Consequently, his awareness of the actual position in Italian and
European political panorama led him to a new powerful position.
What remains unchanged are the political themes he addresses during the
years. Regardless the fact he is or he is not governing the country, Salvini
maintains his strongholds when it comes to use the rhetoric: as shown by
the table 1 and table 2 and demonstrated by the rallies analyses, the topics
where  Salvini  takes  more  advantages  are  the  distrust  towards  the
European institutions and the Italian palaces of powers (even when he
was minister for Internal Affairs) and the anti-migration feelings. To the
latest,  in  addiction,  it  is  mentionable  the  anti-islamic  behavior,  which
improved its  importance in  the early Salvinism, but that  amplified the
echo of the anti-migration according to the needs of his narratives. 
To sum up and answer to the research question, I assure that to cope with
the  Italian  demand,  Salvini  implements  the  souverainist  rhetoric  to  an
already fertile and reactive ground. The Italian demand reacts positively
to Salvini’s  shapeshifter  behavior.  Indeed,  the leader’s  bravura lies  on
taking advantages from electorate’s humoral shift and the ability to re-
attract drifted voters (Stockmer, 2017); from taking the attention high on
core topics, where nativism still plays a pivotal role (Arzheimer, 2018);
from the simpleness and vagueness of the message, that make it largely
shareable and applicable according to the diverse points of view of the
electors; finally, from the attentive use of language and symbols, shaped
accordingly the discourses, and which systematically recall to emotional
stimuli, above all, to fear (Samuel-Arzan, 2018).
Finally, some room will be given to the limitations of the thesis. Indeed,
the fact that only Salvini’s public speeches in specific rallies were taken
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into consideration set aside the enormous data the League leader provided
in the three mandates he played in that role. Furthermore, in this thesis,
the role of social media did not play any part in the analysis, but it is
important  to  mention  that  if  the  support  could  be  measured  with  the
number of interactions in Salvini’s accounts he would probably govern
for ages. I will personally suggest an extension of this thesis in terms of
time-frame and dataset, in order to shape a better comprehension of what
can be considered the most right-shift of the Italian electorate since the
Mussolini experience.
A final and more wider consideration could be done now at the very end
of 2020. Salvini and the League seems to be stable at the first position of
the Italian favors, and Brothers of Italy (the second largest sovereignist
party) is now increasing the pool of voters and supporters. The coalition
of those two parties in Italy, along with the increasing interests on the far
right in Europe,  as instance the Visegrad countries,  could draw a new
horizon for the Union. However, only future elections could enshrine a




In this section there are two tables taken from the work done by Cavallaro et al
(2018) regarding the opinions of the Italian electorate on the issues of nativism,
sovereignism and populism. Those two tables explain the positions of the Italians
and the electoral pool of voters where Salvinism may take roots. The interviewees
were asked to agree or disagree to the following questions:
1. Migrants (security): “if I see many immigrants around, do I feel more insecure?"
2. Migrants (welfare): “an Italian must have a priority on an immigrant, on equal
terms?”
3. Euro: “would be a catastrophe for Italy to leave the Euro?”
4. Sovereignty: “do you think we might take our sovereignty back from the EU?”
5. Political costs: “one of the priorities is to reduce the costs in politics and the
privileges of politicians?”
6. Elite: “the political and financial elites do their own business without taking into
consideration people like me”
In the first table (Tab.1) there is a distinction based on the age of the interviewee,
while in the second table (Tab.2) there is a distinction according to the level of
degree obtained by the interviewee.
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Official YouTube account Lega Salvini Premier retrieved at:
https://www.youtube.com/user/telepadaniatgnord
Official YouTube account Matteo Salvini retrieved at:
https://www.youtube.com/user/matteosalvinimi
“Convegno “Euro o libertà?” – Intervento di Matteo SALVINI” video on 
YouTube, retrieved at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjUeIM6cndQ
“Matteo Salvini – Congresso Lega Nord – 21 maggio 2017” video on 
YouTube, retrieved at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-p9FFXuk1k
“Salvini al congresso della Lega a Milano (21.12.19)” video on YouTube, 
retrieved at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrqjgyQ4zww&t=53s
“INTERVENTO DI MATTEO SALVINI DAL PALCO DI PONTIDA” 
video on YouTube, retrieved at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=HX2tt2EQ5j0
“Pontida 2018” video on YouTube starting at 2:14:20, retrieved at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1WDIIo0cmQ
“INTERVENTO DI MATTEO SALVINI A PONTIDA 2019” video on 
YouTube, retrieved at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arQ9hBKptTI
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